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Abstract 
The strategic decision a firm makes in determining where to set its vertical and horizontal 
boundaries is a widely discussed topic in the literature.  This strategic decision can include 
vertical integration, horizontal integration and diversification outside of the food economy.  
These activities can impact a firm in different ways. 
The objective of this research is to determine whether food economy firms pursuing 
diversification or integration are valued lower or higher as a whole than the sum of their 
individual segments.  This is commonly referred to as a premium or discount.  The hypothesis is 
that a premium exists for food economy firms that pursue integration activities and a discount 
exists for food economy firms that pursue diversification activities.  Four separate food economy 
sectors are used in the analysis: food processing, wholesale grocery, retail supermarkets, and 
restaurants. 
To determine whether a premium or discount exists for integration or diversification, an 
excess value calculation method is used which compares the actual value of a firm to the imputed 
value of all of the segments of a firm.  This excess value is then used in a seemingly unrelated 
regression (SUR) framework to determine how certain firm characteristics influence firm value.  
But, these firm effects may both lead a firm to diversify or integrate and affect firm value.  This 
would incorrectly attribute a premium or discount to the diversification or integration itself and 
not the underlying firm characteristics that caused the firm to pursue such a strategy.  To account 
for these underlying firm and industry characteristics, Heckman’s two-stage procedure is used to 
control for the self-selection of firms that diversify. 
 
 
The SUR results indicate that the hypothesis that integration leads to a premium for food 
economy firms cannot be rejected for the restaurant sector and for the processing sector except in 
the case of vertical integration into retail.  The endogeneity tests indicate that, in most cases, the 
diversification or integration decisions are endogenous meaning that the firm effects that cause 
firms to diversify or integrate are positively or negatively correlated with firm value.  In the 
cases of vertical integration into wholesale in the processing and restaurant sectors and unrelated 
diversification in the restaurant sector, including a self selection parameter makes the premiums 
found using SUR become discounts. 
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CHAPTER 1 - Introduction 
The strategic decision a firm makes in determining where to set its vertical and horizontal 
boundaries is a widely discussed topic in the agricultural economics literature, as well as in 
business literature in general.  When economists discuss these strategic decisions, they use terms 
such as vertical integration and horizontal integration.  Vertical integration is defined as a 
method of vertical marketing system synchronization in which coordination of two or more 
stages occur under common ownership via management directive (Martinez 1999).  Horizontal 
integration is similar to vertical integration except horizontal integration refers to firms pursuing 
activities that are in the same stage in the marketing system.  Figure 1.1 provides an example of 
these integration concepts. 
It is important to note that vertical integration is a type of vertical coordination but 
sometimes these terms are used interchangeably in the economics literature.  In this thesis, 
vertical integration refers to situations in which all coordination activities are owned by a single 
firm.  There are many types of vertical coordination, including contracting and strategic 
alliances.  And, while these types of coordination are important in agricultural markets, they are 
beyond the scope of this study.  Firms pursue strategies to expand or contract their vertical and 
horizontal boundaries for several reasons, including taking advantage of economies of scope and 
scale and differentiating themselves from competitors. 
A related topic in the literature is diversification, a common topic in the business and 
finance literature.  According to this literature, diversification is referred to as related or 
unrelated, meaning that firms can pursue activities that are related to their core businesses and 
activities that are not related to their core businesses.  The distinction is made because the 
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activities can impact a firm in different ways.   For the purposes of this study, diversification 
refers to activities outside of the food economy.  This is done to distinguish diversification from 
vertical or horizontal integration, which are forms of related diversification.  
Unrelated diversification and integration strategies are pursued by firms for financial and 
strategic reasons.  One of the main financial motivations is reducing risk.  Much like an 
individual would reduce risk in their personal investment portfolio, some firms may choose to 
purchase businesses with different market characteristics from their core businesses in order to 
spread risk exposure.  This is commonly referred to as unrelated diversification and for the 
purposes of this paper is referred to simply as diversification. 
A strategic reason for integration is to exploit economies of scope.  Economies of scope 
exist when a firm achieves savings as it increases the variety of goods or services it produces 
(Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley 2000).  Some firms find they have resources available that they 
cannot utilize in their current operations.  These include managerial as well as physical 
resources.  Sometimes it is possible to increase the size of the firm’s current operations to take 
advantage of these resources but other times this may not be possible due to competitive 
conditions in the market.  In this case, a firm could choose to integrate into similar markets to 
utilize current resources, creating economies of scope.  For example, if a firm processes and 
mills wheat, it may be able to use the same production facilities and transportation network to 
process other commodities. 
Many authors suggest that the presence of vertical integration is motivated by transaction 
costs (Martinez 2002, Hennessy 1996, Frank and Henderson 1992).  Martinez (2002) discusses 
theories originally presented by Williamson (1991) which indicate that asset specificity is the 
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transaction cost associated with spot-market coordination.  When the level of asset specificity is 
very high vertical integration is the method of vertical coordination that minimizes costs. 
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Raw Input:  Wheat 
Wholesale 
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Processing:  Bread 
and Bakery Products 
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and Crackers 
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Breakfast Cereal 
Example of Horizontal Integration 
Example of 
Vertical 
Integration 
Figure 1.1  Example of the Flow of Goods in the Food Value Chain 
1.1 Objective 
Because firms diversify and integrate for different reasons, it is not immediately clear how these 
decisions affect firm value.  The research literature is not definitive on whether firms pursuing 
diversification or integration are valued lower or higher as a whole than the sum of their 
individual segments would be if they were stand-alone firms.  This concept is commonly referred 
to as a discount or premium. 
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This study looks specifically at the food economy.  The reasons for doing so are 
discussed in the next section.  The hypothesis is that a premium exists for food economy firms 
that pursue integration activities and a discount exists for food economy firms that pursue 
diversification activities.  Diversification is thought to be a discount because the literature has 
generally found a discount from diversification for firms in the US economy (Berger and Ofek 
1995, Lang and Stulz 1994, Servaes 1996, Laeven and Levine 2005).  It is thought that 
integration increases firm value because this is the prevailing thought in the agricultural 
economics literature and integration is prevalent in food economy firms (Barkema, Drabenstott, 
and Welch 1991, Young and Hobbs 2002). 
While many studies have investigated the discount and premium for diversification 
described above, none have specifically singled out the food economy as a basis for analysis and 
separated the effects of diversification and integration.  Therefore, the objective of this study is 
to analyze whether a discount or premium exists in four distinct sectors of the food economy as 
defined by Harris et. al. (2002).  These four sectors are: 
• Food processing: firms and their establishments that manufacture or process foods 
and beverages for human consumption and other related products such as 
manufactured ice, chewing gum, vegetable and animal fats and oils, and prepared 
feeds for animals and fowls.   
• Wholesale grocery:  part of the food system in which goods are assembled, stored, 
and transported to retailers, food service organizations (hotels, restaurants, schools, 
etc.), other wholesalers, exporters, or other types of businesses. 
• Retail supermarket: a retail food store that sells a general line of food products such 
as canned and frozen foods; fresh fruits and vegetables; fresh and prepared meats, fish 
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and poultry; and non food grocery products for which the majority of the sales in food 
products are intended for off-premises preparation and consumption. 
• Restaurant: an establishment that dispenses prepared meals and snacks for on-premise 
or immediate consumption.  
Firms are assigned to the above sectors based on four-digit U.S. Department of Commerce 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes under which they are required to report financial 
information.  The specific codes and descriptions used in this study are given in Appendix A. 
Each of the four sectors described above are analyzed separately in the following 
chapters because the unique characteristics of the food economy discussed in the next section 
may influence different sectors in different ways.  Also, reasons for diversification and 
integration may differ among sectors of the food economy. 
The food processing sector is the largest of the four sectors.  Rogers (2001) studied 
consolidation in the food processing sector and found that it has steadily increased since 1954.  
In 1987, the top twenty food processing firms accounted for 36 percent of industry sales.  This 
amount rose to 44 percent in 1992 and then to 51 percent in 1997.  Harris et. al. (2002) gives 
three reasons why food processing firms may be seeking to integrate through mergers and 
consolidation.  First, less efficient plants are closing or merging with efficient plants (U.S. 
Industry and Trade Outlook 2000).  Second, firms can broaden product lines and gain domestic 
market share through mergers, which is often difficult in mature markets.  Third, food processors 
may use mergers as a defensive strategy to counter the purchasing clout of increasingly 
concentrated food retailers. 
Most of the integration in the restaurant sector is occurring because large restaurant 
chains are acquiring or developing food processing facilities to manufacture food ingredients 
 6
and/or prepared foods for sale at their restaurants.  This may increase efficiency and help ensure 
a consistent product. 
The wholesale grocery and retail supermarket sectors are examined separately in this 
research but it is important to note the relationship between these two sectors.  Traditional food 
wholesalers that buy food from manufacturers and then sell to retail food stores are becoming 
scarce (Kinsey 1999).  It is becoming more common for manufacturers to deliver products 
directly to stores.  Self-distributing retailers are also very common, accounting for 47 of the 50 
largest food retailers in 1999.  These firms own their own distribution centers and buy directly 
from manufacturers.  Along with the trends mentioned above, the supermarket sector is also 
becoming more concentrated.  The largest 4, 8, and 20 food retailers accounted for 28, 41 and 52 
percent of U.S. retail grocery stores sales in 2000, a significant increase from 1996 (Harris et. al. 
2002). 
1.2 Motivation 
The food system is a very important part of the U.S. economy.  Food and fiber manufacturing 
and distribution accounted for 7.7 percent of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP) and employed 
12 percent of the U.S. labor force in 2000 (Harris et. al. 2002).  Also, there are many things that 
make agricultural and food businesses distinctly different than businesses in other sectors of the 
economy.  According to Kinsey (2001) the food economy is “one of the most dynamic and 
critical industries in the country and the world.”  Sonka and Hudson (1989) list five 
characteristics that make the food economy unique: 
• The unique cultural, institutional, and political aspects of food, domestically and 
internationally. 
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• The uncertainty arising from the underlying biologic basis of crop and livestock 
production. 
• The alternative goals and forms of political intervention across subsectors and 
between nations in an increasingly global industry. 
• Institutional arrangements that place significant portions of the technology 
development process in the public sector. 
• The differing competitive structures existing within and among the subsectors of the 
food and agribusiness sector. 
Sonka and Hudson (1989) suggest that these characteristics imply special managerial skills and 
knowledge may be needed to make efficient and effective decisions in agribusiness firms.  This 
special knowledge could include how diversification and integration strategies affect the value of 
a food business and/or agribusiness firm. 
One of the facts that most strongly influences the uniqueness of the food economy is that 
food is necessary for every person.  Also, food and the atmosphere in which it is prepared and 
consumed is one of the most important parts of human culture.  Most food is highly perishable 
and can harm people if spoiled.  Therefore, food and its production are very heavily regulated 
and supported by most governments.  This regulation has increased with the recent increased 
emphasis on food safety. 
Another unique characteristic of the food industry is the distinctive production risks that 
influence inputs to the food value chain.  Most other industries do not have weather, disease and 
pest issues that influence their input supply.  This causes an unusually high level of uncertainty 
in the food economy.  Perishability of agricultural products also presents unique challenges for 
firms that produce, distribute and sell food. 
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1.3 Chapter Organization 
The following chapter, Chapter 2, discusses several relevant areas of the literature that address 
diversification and integration and their impact on the firm.  Chapter 3 presents a conceptual 
model to assess the premium or discount associated with integration and diversification strategies 
and discusses the food economy data and empirical framework used to estimate the conceptual 
model.  In Chapter 4, the results of the analysis are presented and discussed.  Finally, 
conclusions, limitations, and suggestions for future research are presented in Chapter 5. 
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CHAPTER 2 - Literature Review 
Many articles have been written discussing the decision to integrate or diversify and the impacts 
of these decisions on the firm.  The following sections discuss and summarize various topics 
related to vertical and horizontal integration, diversification and firm valuation found in the 
current literature. 
2.1 Vertical and Horizontal Integration 
Integration is a widely discussed topic in the economics literature.  The first section below covers 
several articles that discuss and develop the theory of integration in economics.  This is followed 
by a discussion of some research related to integration in the food economy.  Most of this 
research is theoretical as well although there are a few empirical studies. 
2.1.1 Integration Theory 
Vertical and horizontal integration are important topics in agricultural economics literature and 
are becoming more so as these and other types of market coordination strategies become more 
prevalent.  According to Barry, Sonka, and Lajili (1992), “the manager’s task now involves 
selecting the boundaries of the firm (defined by contractual and asset control relationships) along 
with the more traditional tasks of choosing the firm’s size, enterprises, and financing.” 
An influential paper by Coase (1937) was among the first to discuss integration and its 
relationship to the definition of a firm, indicating the “supersession of the price mechanism” 
through vertical integration is a defining characteristic of a firm.  Firms can get the inputs they 
need from other firms, through a contractual arrangement or they can make them within their 
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own firm.  But, as Coase (1937) discusses, complete contract development and enforcement are 
difficult.  Because of this difficulty firms may be better off purchasing other firms that already 
produce the inputs needed instead of contracting with them. 
If a firm begins producing its own inputs, it may not continue to do so indefinitely.  
Cotterill (2001) discusses and builds upon the work of Stigler (1951) who lays out a theoretical 
framework for the process by which small firms begin by incorporating several production 
processes for which there are no other firms to produce these specialized products.  Over time, 
output expands until the individual processes within the firm experience decreasing returns.  This 
will lead to market entry and a competitive market structure.  Then, according to Stigler, 
economic growth and spin-offs by the original firm would increase the optimal scale.  Cotterill 
also discusses how mergers, or more specifically, leveraged buyouts (LBOs) impact firm value, 
pointing out that in many cases the only increases in value are the fees paid to the coordinators of 
the LBOs.  And in the case of supermarkets, horizontal mergers have been used to increase 
pricing power but have not successfully increased firm value. 
Grossman and Hart (1986) develop a theoretical model to try to discover under what 
circumstances a firm will be better off by contracting with another firm than by owning it.  The 
results are stated as follows: 
If total and marginal benefits of investment move together, firm i ownership of firms i 
and j will lead to overinvestment by firm i and underinvestment by firm j.  On the other 
hand, nonintegration will lead to moderate investment levels by each firm.  The optimal 
ownership structure will be chosen to minimize the overall loss in surplus due to 
investment distortions. (p. 710) 
 
This result indicates that an integration strategy will be pursued if one firm’s investment decision 
is more important than that of the other firm and nonintegration will be pursued if the investment 
decisions of both firms are less important. 
 11
Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (2000) and Porter (1980) refer to the decision to 
vertically integrate as the “make versus buy” decision.  These decisions must be made regarding 
activities both above and below a firm’s current activities on the value chain.1  For example, 
manufacturers must decide if they should produce and store their own inputs or whether they 
should store and sell their own outputs.  The factors that influence the make or buy decision are 
varied and complex.  Porter (1980) discusses the various strategic benefits and costs of these 
decisions which are outlined below: 
• Strategic benefits of integration 
o Economies of Integration 
 Economies of combined operations 
 Economies of internal control and coordination 
 Economies of information 
 Economies of avoiding the market 
 Economies of stable relationships 
o Tap into technology 
o Offset bargaining power and input cost distortion 
o Enhanced ability to differentiate 
o Elevate entry and mobility barriers 
o Enter a higher-return business 
o Defend against foreclosure 
• Strategic costs of integration 
                                                 
1“Above” refers to activities that are upstream or backwards on the value chain.  In other words, those activities that 
are closer to the producers of raw inputs.  “Below” refers to activities that are downstream or forward on the value 
chain.  In other words, those activities that are closer to the consumer. 
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o Costs of overcoming mobility barriers 
o Increased operating leverage 
o Reduced flexibility to change partners 
o Higher overall exit barriers 
o Capital investment requirements 
o Foreclosure of access to supplier or consumer research and/or know-how 
o Maintaining balance 
o Dulled incentives 
o Differing managerial requirements 
Porter (1980) also discusses specific strategic issues associated with integrating forward 
and backward in the value chain.  These include improved ability to differentiate the product, 
access to distribution channels, better access to market information, and higher price realization.  
Strategic issues in backward integration include proprietary knowledge and differentiation. 
According to Porter (1980), when firms are making vertical integration decisions there 
are several myths that can arise that can keep firms from making an appropriate decision.  These 
common myths are: 
1. A strong market position in one stage can automatically be extended to the other. 
2. It is always cheaper to do things internally. 
3. It often makes sense to integrate into a competitive business. 
4. Vertical integration can save a strategically sick business. 
5. Experience in one part of the vertical chain automatically qualifies management 
to direct upstream or downstream units. 
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Each firm’s situation is different and while the above statements may be true in some cases they 
are certainly not true in every case. 
2.1.2. Integration in the Food Economy 
Barkema, Drabenstott, and Welch (1991) discuss why food markets are changing and moving 
toward alternative market structures such as contracting and vertical integration.  As consumers 
demand more specialized products, channels must be developed to manufacture and market the 
increasing number of specialized products.  The previous system was not able to handle the 
changing market situation so new structures are being developed to shorten communication 
channels and make sure the wide variety of consumer needs can be met in an efficient manner.  
Firm strategies such as vertical integration can help accomplish this goal. Sexton (2000) implies 
that vertical coordination has been able to move the market toward this goal by allowing firms to 
meet consumer’s needs for specialized, high-quality products.  Also, horizontal coordination has 
been able to take advantage of economies of improved processing technologies and marketing 
techniques. 
Bhuyan (2001) provides one of the few empirical studies to investigate the impact of 
vertical mergers on profitability of the firm in the agricultural economics literature.  The author 
develops an industry level empirical model for 43 food manufacturing SIC codes in which net 
industry profit is the dependent variable.  The explanatory variables include an indicator of 
forward vertical mergers, a productivity index, four firm market concentration (CR4), a regional 
dummy variable, advertising to sales ratio, research and development expenditures to sales ratio, 
capital to sales ratio, import to sales ratio, and domestic demand.  Data for Bhuyan’s study were 
gathered from a number of public information sources including the National Bureau of 
Economic Research (NBER) and results from various years of the U.S. Department of 
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Commerce Census of Manufacturers.  The regression analysis indicated that the vertical merger 
indicator variable had a negative impact on the profitability of the food manufacturing industries 
studied.  Therefore the author states that, according to his findings, “forward vertical mergers 
failed to create or contribute to the creation of differential advantage or efficiency of the 
integrated firms in U.S. food manufacturing industries.”  The analysis also indicated that 
increased market concentration positively and significantly influences profitability. 
Hennessy (1996) summarizes the integration literature in agricultural economics.  He 
suggests that firm structure, desire to reduce variability in supply, and cost of testing for quality 
are the three most common reasons discussed in the literature for integration in the food 
economy. 
Table 1 in Frank and Henderson (1992) shows the extent of vertical integration in the 
food processing sector in 1982.  The range was zero percent to 44 percent (macaroni and 
spaghetti). A vertical coordination index is constructed using an input-output matrix to determine 
upstream and downstream coordination in the food manufacturing industry.  The data used are 
from the U.S. Department of Commerce Census of Agriculture and Census of Manufacturers as 
well as other authors.  The vertical coordination index is then used as the dependent variable in 
regression analysis.  Input uncertainty, concentration, and asset investment were significant 
determinants of vertical integration. 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the change in organizational form is not shifting to one 
particular strategy but instead to a wide variety of strategies.  As this organization and 
coordination of agricultural markets changes, the implications can be vast and varied.  Therefore 
several authors have sought to summarize these changes and the impacts on the market.  Young 
and Hobbs (2002) sum up the current trend as follows, “closer vertical coordination has occurred 
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as the use of spot markets has declined, while production and marketing contracts, franchising 
strategic alliances, joint ventures, and full vertical integration have increased.”(p. 428)  As 
contracting and integration become more prevalent, the availability and relevance of open market 
prices decrease.  Also, measuring and verifying quality becomes more difficult.  MacDonald et. 
al. (2004) also discuss the trends in agricultural organizational form.  Their discussion is mainly 
related to contracting but vertical integration is also included.  They focus on contracting because 
it is actually more prevalent now than vertical integration in agricultural production.  MacDonald 
et. al. indicate, as did several of the authors discussed above, that vertical coordination will likely 
continue to increase to allow for consistent supply and quality of agricultural products. 
Lubatkin et. al. (2001) investigates the performance benefits that arose from two 
horizontal mergers in the food manufacturing industry, R.J. Reynolds’ acquisition of Nabisco in 
1984 and Nestlé’s acquisition of Carnation Company in 1984.  The authors use data from 1985 
to 1990.  They use seemingly unrelated regression on six equations (one for each year) that 
contained extramarket performance (returns that exceed those normally achieved in the market 
place) as the dependent variable and variables such as market share change, market concentration 
and market growth as independent variables.  The conclusions from the analysis were that the 
performance benefits of horizontal mergers depend on four competitive factors: where (the 
characteristics of the product-markets), when (the influence of firm, industry, and population), 
who (firms are not equally capable of benefiting from horizontal merger), and how (both relative 
market share and relatedness influence success). 
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2.2 Diversification 
Much of the diversification literature in finance is motivated by unrelated diversification.  That 
is, firms pursuing diversification that is unrelated to their core business as a means of creating a 
portfolio.  While both related and unrelated diversification literature is discussed below, this 
research refers to unrelated diversification as simply diversification and calls related 
diversification horizontal or vertical integration as discussed above. 
Martin and Sayrak (2003) present a survey of recent literature on corporate 
diversification in which they point out two distinct sections of the literature which deal 
specifically with the benefits and costs of diversification.  The first two sections below, 
discussing the benefits of diversification and the costs of diversification, are adapted from Martin 
and Sayrak’s work. 
2.2.1 Benefits of Diversification 
As discussed in the introduction, there are several benefits to diversification that may induce a 
firm to adopt a diversification strategy.  This section highlights some articles that have discussed 
these benefits. 
In a 1994 article, Montgomery examines three comprehensive views on the motivation 
for diversification.  The market power view refers to a firm’s desire to decrease competition 
through diversification.  The resource view theorizes that rent-seeking firms choose to diversify 
in response to excess resource capacity.  The agency view refers to the various benefits managers 
may receive from diversification. 
Lewellen (1971) gives the following four sources of gain from a merger, several of which 
correspond to the views presented by Montgomery (1994): 
1. Opportunities for economies of scale or other direct efficiencies in manufacturing. 
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2. The enhancement of competitive sales positions through augmented monopoly 
power. 
3. A complementarity in research and basic technological expertise relating to new 
products. 
4. A convenient fit of scarce managerial skills leading to greater administrative 
efficiency. 
Amihud and Lev (1981) suggest that there is often a managerial motive for pursuing 
diversification.  Managers want to reduce their ‘employment risk’ or the risk of losing their job 
or professional reputation.  This can be done by spreading firm risk over more activities through 
a conglomerate merger.  Firm risk is often closely related to personal risk for a manager whose 
income is directly influenced by the financial success of the firm through profit-sharing, stock 
options, bonuses, etc. 
Firms differ in how much control a manager has over diversification decisions and this 
decision is most pronounced between owner-controlled and manager-controlled firms.  Amihud 
and Lev (1981) test the hypothesis that diversification decisions are influenced by managers’ 
preferences in two different ways using Standard and Poor’s Compustat data for 309 firms from 
1961 to 1970.  The first test uses a linear regression model to determine the effects of the type of 
firm control (strong owner control, weak owner control, and manager control) on the number and 
type (horizontal, vertical, or conglomerate) of acquisitions undertaken by a firm while 
controlling for the size of the firm.  This model indicates that manager-controlled firms engage in 
more conglomerate mergers than owner-controlled firms.  The second test also uses a linear 
regression model to determine the effect of the type of control on the degree of diversification 
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and finds that the activities of manager-controlled firms are more diversified than owner-
controlled firms. 
Aggarwal and Samwick (2003) studied why managers diversified their firms.  Their 
model offers two reasons:  1) to reduce risk and 2) to capture private benefits.  Private benefits 
from diversification could include improving future career prospects (Gibbons and Murphy 
1992) and increased prestige, power, and perquisites of running a more diversified firm (Jensen 
1986, Stulz 1990).  Other private benefits include increased pay (Jensen and Murphy 1990) and 
more opportunities for skimming2 (Bertrand and Mullainathan 2001) because a larger and/or 
more complex firm provides more resources from which managers can draw. 
Aggarwal and Samwick use data from Standard and Poor’s Compustat and ExecuComp 
data sets for 1993 to 1998 to empirically estimate a model with Tobin’s q3 as the dependent 
variable.  The independent variables include CEO incentives, team incentives, diversification, 
number of segments, leverage, and several other financial ratios.  In contrast to previous 
literature, their findings suggest that, managers do not diversify to reduce risk exposure.  Instead, 
they respond to the private benefits of diversification.  When the private benefits of 
diversification increase, managers will diversify more. 
Another benefit of diversification, as suggested by Stein (1997), is that managers have 
more information than external capital markets and, therefore, can allocate resources more 
efficiently in diversified firms than in external capital markets.  Stulz (1990) points out that 
internal capital markets are also larger in diversified firms and underinvestment is decreased.   
 
                                                 
2 Skimming refers to managers taking advantage of resources and privileges. 
3 Tobin’s q is the ratio of the market value of a firm’s assets (as measured by the market value of its outstanding 
stock and debt) to replacement cost of the firm’s assets (Tobin, 1969). 
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2.2.2 The Costs of Diversification 
While there are managerial benefits to diversification, there are also managerial costs.  Most of 
the literature that discusses costs of diversification refers to the managerial agency problems that 
arise (Martin and Sayrak 2003).  In other words, managers tend to overinvest when there is free 
cash flow, and when a firm is diversified there is likely to be free cash flow which aggravates the 
overinvestment problem (Jensen 1986). 
Meyer, Milgrom, and Roberts (1992) speak specifically to the disadvantageous labor 
situation created by mergers and divestitures.  A divestiture refers to a firm selling an individual 
segment to a new owner.  They point out that special influence costs arise when managers are 
trying to protect their jobs from a potential layoff.4  
Another cost of diversification is the asymmetric information problem between corporate 
and division management in a diversified firm (Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv 1982).  Asymmetric 
information can be a problem in any firm where the headquarters are far from local divisions but 
diversification can magnify the problem.  This could be because the managers have been 
integrated into the firm from an acquisition or the firm operates in segments that are not 
synergistic.  Asymmetry can arise from lack of information on the part of one party or from 
conflicting goals between corporate and division management (Harris, Kriebel, and Raviv 1982). 
2.2.3 Diversification and Firm Performance 
Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) use data from manufacturing firms from 1975 to 1992 to 
determine how firm characteristics influence diversification decisions.  Three main results follow 
from their analysis.  First, plants of single-segment firms are more productive than plants of 
conglomerate firms that are of a similar size, except for the smallest plants.  Second, productivity 
                                                 
4 Influence cost refers to any cost that arises such as loss of work time due to politicking and campaigning. 
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patterns within the segments of conglomerate firms are consistent with a simple value-
maximizing model.  This supports the hypothesis by the authors that firms invest where they 
have comparative advantage.  Third, segment growth is strongly related to fundamental industry 
factors and productivity of individual segments.  Maksimovic and Phillips (2002) measure 
productivity in terms of total factor productivity (TFP) where TFP compares the actual amount 
of output produced for a given amount of inputs to the output the plant should have produced 
given the inputs used.  
Wernerfelt and Montgomery (1988) use Tobin’s q as a measure of firm performance and 
find that industry effects are the major determinants of firm success.  This is done by estimating 
a model with Tobin’s q as the dependent variable and values that might vary by industry as 
dependent variables.  These industry effects include investments in fixed capital, advertising, and 
research and development.  Industry effects exist in the form of positive focus effects.  An 
example of a focus effect would be that widely diversified (less-focused) firms cannot transfer 
competencies in one market to many other markets.  This means that, according to the authors, 
some differences in performance can be explained by the differences that arise when competency 
is transferred to widely varying markets. 
According to Comment and Jarrell (1995), the widespread diversification trend that had 
been prevalent since the 1950s began to reverse in the late 1980s, possibly due to the negative 
economies of scope during this period.  The analysis undertaken by Comment and Jarrell focuses 
on the fact that diversified firms do not take advantage of some of the efficiencies that motivate 
diversification, specifically:   
• Diversification permits a greater use of debt (because the coinsurance of debt 
reduces default rates). 
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• Diversification permits a substitution of intersegment cash transfers for arms-
length transactions (because transaction costs are lower in internal capital markets 
than external capital markets). 
• Diversification increases the likelihood of takeover because (conversely) these 
intersegment transfers accommodate a waste of free cash flow. 
Comment and Jarrell (1995) find that, in the years 1979 to 1989, debt is not increased 
through diversification and reliance on external capital markets does not decrease.  But, there is 
some evidence that diversification increases the likelihood of a takeover. 
2.2.4 Related versus Unrelated Diversification 
Whether diversification is related or unrelated is one of the most prolific sections of the 
diversification literature.  The literature seems to indicate that relatedness of a firm’s business 
operations is thought to be one of the most important factors in the success of a diversified firm. 
Ding, Caswell, and Zhou (1987) examine the effects of related and unrelated 
diversification using Compustat data for 35 food manufacturing firms from 1981 to 1989.  As 
originally outlined by Salter and Weinhold (1979), they consider diversification to be related if it 
involves businesses that: 
• serve similar markets or use similar markets or use similar distribution systems, 
• employ similar production technologies, 
• exploit similar science-based research, or 
• operate at different stages of the same commercial chain. 
If diversification does not fall into any of these categories, it is unrelated.  For example, 
Sara Lee’s branded apparel segment would be considered unrelated diversification relative to its 
branded food and beverage businesses.   
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Ding, Caswell, and Zhou (1987) use two different measures of firm performance as 
dependent variables in a single-equation multivariate model.  Return on equity was used to 
measure firm performance in terms of the efficiency with which profits are generated from a 
given bundle of capital.  Changes in stock price plus dividends paid was the second firm 
performance measure used and was intended to measure firm performance from the 
stockholder’s perspective.  The independent variables were related diversification, unrelated 
diversification, relative market share, four-firm concentration ratio, and sales growth rate.  The 
results of the regressions indicated that related diversification is positively related to stock 
market value but unrelated diversification did not show a negative relationship.  This may be due 
to the ambiguity of the SIC codes for defining related and unrelated diversification.  The 
profitability measure shows only a very weak relationship between performance and 
diversification. 
Christensen and Montgomery (1981) use data from 1972 to 1977 to investigate the 
suitability of a nine category diversification strategy classification system originally proposed by 
Rumelt (1974).  The nine categories are:  single, dominant, dominant vertical, dominant 
constrained, dominant linked, dominant unrelated, related, related constrained, related linked, 
unrelated, multi-business, and unrelated-portfolio.5  
Rumelt’s work improved on the previous classification of related and unrelated 
diversification by assigning more detailed and specific definitions to each class.  Therefore, 
Christensen and Montgomery use Rumelt’s framework to discuss how market characteristics 
influence the type of diversification undertaken by a firm.  If, for example, a firm is in a ‘low 
                                                 
5 See Rumelt (1974) for category definitions. 
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opportunity’ market it will likely not gain much through constrained diversification.6  Therefore, 
it will likely pursue unrelated diversification.  Several findings of this study could be useful to 
managers.  Specifically, constrained diversification does not assure high earnings.  Also, 
managers should avoid highly fragmented, low profit markets if the businesses in these markets 
are being purchased just for the attractive price.  A longer run view is essential in this situation to 
assess whether there is profit potential in the future regardless of the current price. 
Palepu (1985) explores the profitability of related versus unrelated diversifying firms 
over time using data from 30 firms during the years 1973 to 1979.  The study reveals several 
important findings.  First, the profitability of firms that diversify into related activities is 
significantly greater than that of firms that diversify into unrelated activities.  Second, this 
profitability persists over time for firms that continue to engage in related diversification. 
Nayyar (1993) measures the relative performance effects from two possible benefits of 
diversification: information asymmetry and economies of scope.  If either one of these benefits is 
present, related diversification results.  This study specifically looks at a random sample of 513 
service firms.  The author found that there are significant differences in performance between the 
benefits of information asymmetry and benefits of economies of scope as measured by stock 
market reactions to diversification activities.  Specifically, seeking benefits from information 
asymmetry was perceived to be more valuable than seeking benefits from economies of scope.  
This seems to indicate that not all related diversification has the same effect on value, at least 
from a stock market valuation perspective.  The reason for the related diversification is also 
influential. 
 
                                                 
6 Constrained diversification refers to diversification that builds on a single strength or resource associated with the 
original business (Christensen and Montgomery 1981). 
 24
2.2.5 The Diversification Discount 
There are many studies investigating the existence of the diversification discount, some of which 
are discussed below.  Table 2.1 summarizes the research discussed in this study that investigate 
the diversification discount. 
Papers by Lang and Stulz (1994), Berger and Ofek (1995), and Servaes (1996) were 
among the first to show the existence of this discount for multiple-segment firms relative to 
single-segment firms.7  A segment refers to a part of a firm that operates under a different four-
digit U.S. Department of Commerce Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code than other 
parts of the firm.8  
Berger and Ofek (1995) give the following reason for trying to determine the value of 
diversification: 
Theoretical arguments suggest that diversification has both value-enhancing and value 
reducing effects.  The potential benefits of operating different lines of business within 
one firm include greater operating efficiency, less incentive to forego positive net present 
value projects, greater debt capacity, and lower taxes.  The potential costs of 
diversification include the use of increased discretionary resources to undertake value-
decreasing investments, cross-subsidies that allow poor segments to drain resources from 
better-performing segments, and misalignment of incentives between central and division 
managers.  There is no clear prediction about the overall value effect of diversification.  
(p. 40) 
 
Berger and Ofek (1995) use an excess value model of firm value to measure the 
diversification discount.  Excess value is calculated by computing values for each individual 
business segment and comparing the sum of these values to the actual value of the firm as a 
whole.  If the sum of the values of the individual segments is greater than the actual value of the 
                                                 
7 Recall that in finance literature diversification refers to related and unrelated diversification unless otherwise 
noted. 
8 The SIC code system becomes increasingly specific as numbers are added to the code.  For example, SIC 20 
indicates Food and Kindred Products manufacturing, SIC 205 indicates Bakery Products, and SIC 2052 indicates 
Cookies and Crackers.  See Appendix A for more details. 
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firm, excess value exists that may be attributable to diversification.  This excess value is the 
value lost from diversification or the “diversification discount.”  The excess value formula is 
defined as EV = ln (V / IV)  where V is the sum of the market value of equity and the book value 
of debt and IV is the sum of the imputed values for each individual business segment.  Due to the 
costs of diversification discussed in literature, which are particularly high in conglomerate firms, 
Berger and Ofek hypothesize that a diversification discount does exist. 
The data used by Berger and Ofek (1995) include information for 3,659 firms from 1986 
to 1991.  Firms in the financial sector as well as firms with sales below $20 million are excluded.  
Firms in the financial sector are excluded because they do not report information on earnings 
before interest and taxes (EBIT) due to the fact that this value has no meaning in financial 
companies. 
To provide additional evidence for the relationship between firm value and 
diversification, the excess value measure is used as the dependent variable in a regression model 
that includes a binary variable for diversification whose regression coefficient gives the 
percentage difference in average excess value between focused and diversified firms.  Various 
firm effect variables are also included, specifically firm size, profitability, and growth.  As 
hypothesized, there is an average value loss from diversification.  The value loss ranged from 
13% to 15%.  This regression is then extended to see how relatedness of the diversification and 
year influences the regression results.  Firm segments are considered unrelated if they have 
different SIC codes at the two-digit level.  For related diversification, the value loss is found to 
be much less.  Also, the results vary between time periods.  Berger and Ofek (1995) also 
examine the profitability of diversified versus single-segment firms and find that profitability 
(measured by EBIT divided by sales and EBIT divided by assets) is lower for diversified firms. 
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Overinvestment by diversified firms is said to be a source of value loss.  To examine 
whether this is true, Berger and Ofek (1995) regress the excess value calculation described above 
on a measure of overinvestment and control for assets, EBIT, and capital expenditures.  
Overinvestment for a firm is defined as the sum of depreciation-adjusted capital expenditures for 
all of the segments of the firm whose median Tobin’s q is in the lowest quartile, scaled by total 
sales.  Higher values of overinvestment, as it is defined here, represent more unprofitable 
investments.  The results suggest that overinvestment is correlated with lower value for 
diversified firms. 
Lang and Stulz (1994) use Tobin’s q as a measure of firm value and find that it is 
negatively related with firm diversification throughout the late 1970s and 1980s.  They find that 
single-segment firms are valued more highly than diversified firms by capital markets.  
Examining the mean and median Tobin’s q for diversified firms, the authors find that these 
values are below the sample average of nondiversified firms for each year in the sample. 
Lang and Stulz (1994) also investigate whether the relationship between Tobin’s q and 
diversification can be explained by industry effects.  Lang and Stulz use size, research and 
development investments, and ability to access financial markets as industry effects.  The 
analysis of industry effects is done by compiling portfolios of specialized firms that resemble 
diversified firms.  This analysis reveals that the magnitude of the diversification discount is 
reduced by accounting for industry effects.  Further analysis indicates industry effects do not 
explain the entire diversification discount but they do explain some of it. 
Servaes (1996) also analyzes the diversification discount using data from 1961 to 1976.  
He finds that there is a discount in the 1960s but it declines to nearly zero in the early and mid-
1970s.  In contrast to the other studies, this paper examines the effect of insider ownership on 
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diversification.  When the diversification discount was large (1961-1970) the firms with high 
insider ownership resisted diversification but when the diversification discount declined, these 
firms quickly diversified. 
Katchova (2005) uses the same method as Berger and Ofek (1995) but applies it to farm 
level data, specifically U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA), National Agricultural Statistics 
Service’s (NASS) Agricultural Resource Management Survey (ARMS) data from 1999, 2000, 
and 2001.  All farms with total assets of $40,000 or more and a value of total production of 
$10,000 or more were used in the sample.  Farms with extreme excess values were excluded.  
After screening, the sample included 15,030 farm observations from 1999 to 2001, 9,088 
specialized crop or livestock farms and 5,942 crop/livestock diversified farms.  The methods 
used by Katchova had to be changed slightly from the Berger and Ofek model to account for the 
definitions of diversification at the farm level.  As mentioned above, corporate firms use SIC 
codes to define segments, but for farms the diversification is defined by either crop or livestock 
production.  Within either the crop or livestock group the farms can then be separated by 
commodity (corn, hogs, soybeans, etc.).  Katchova finds a diversification discount of 5.8% for 
crop/livestock diversified farms and 9.4% for commodity diversified firms. 
Laeven and Levine (2005) examine whether a diversification discount exists in a specific 
sector of the economy.  Laeven and Levine look specifically at financial conglomerates.  Their 
sample comes from Bankscope and includes 836 banks, across 43 countries, over the period 
1998 to 2002.  They use Tobin’s q and an excess value calculation to examine diversification in 
income and in assets.  As has been pointed out by several other authors, firm characteristics that 
guide diversification decisions can also affect firm value.  For this reason, Laevan and Levine 
use four instrumental variable specifications to control for firm characteristics and endogeneity 
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concerns.  These variables are then used in Heckman’s (1979) two-step procedure to control for 
self-selection bias.  A diversification discount is found in all cases. 
Denis, Denis and Yost (2002) studied whether the diversification discount applies to 
global diversification as it does to industrial diversification.  They find that there is a discount 
associated with global diversification.  Two explanations are given for the diversification 
discount.  First, diversification and firm value are endogenously related, meaning that either 
firms diversify by purchasing lower-valued firms or lower-valued firms choose to diversify.  The 
other possibility is that diversification destroys value and therefore causes the diversification 
discount. 
Lamont and Polk (2001) approach the diversification discount from the standpoint of the 
differences in future cash flows and future returns between discounted firms and premium firms.  
The data and subsequent analysis discussed in this paper find that expected returns are higher in 
firms with a diversification discount than in premium firms.  They find that about half of the 
variance in excess value can be attributed to differences in future cash flow between diversified 
and single-segment firms.  The other half is due to differences in future returns and covariance 
between returns and cash flows. 
Gomes and Livdan (2004) use a theoretical framework to study the existence of a 
diversification discount or lack thereof.  They use methods similar to those of Lang and Stulz 
(1994).  They find that, as documented by Schoar (2002), expanding firms are less productive 
than other firms and experience productivity loss after expansion.  Also, differences in size 
account for part of the productivity and valuation differences between diversified and focused 
firms.  The most surprising finding in this study was that the diversification discount found by 
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Lang and Stulz can be obtained.  This is especially interesting considering that, in their model, 
diversification does not destroy value. 
2.2.5.1 Alternative Explanations for the Diversification Discount 
Campa and Kedia (2002) argue that, although several studies have proven the existence of a 
diversification discount, the failure to control for firm effects that lead to diversification and 
therefore a discount may attribute the discount to diversification when it is really caused by other 
underlying characteristics.  Firms choose to diversify and make this decision based usually on a 
complex set of circumstances.  Following analysis using Compustat data from 1978 to 1996, they 
find that the correlation between diversification and firm value is not causal.  This conclusion is 
reached by using instrumental variables to control for exogenous characteristics that predict the 
decision to diversify. 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf (2002) contend that analyzing segments of firms as if they 
were stand-alone firms (as is done by Berger and Ofek) is not appropriate.  They believe that 
divisions of diversified firms are systematically different than stand-alone firms.  For example, 
sometimes firms are priced at a discount before becoming part of a merged firm.  The authors 
use Compustat data for 356 firms from 1980 to 1995 that have made acquisitions and account for 
the existing characteristics of the acquired firms.  They find that these characteristics explain 
nearly all of the reduction in the excess value of the acquiring firm after the merger, regardless of 
the type of acquisition and type of firm. 
Villalonga presents two different studies that seek to refute the existence of the 
diversification discount.  The first study (2004a) hypothesizes that the diversification discount 
could be due to the inappropriateness of the segment data that is used to measure it in most 
previous studies.  She uses Business Information Tracking Series data for the whole US 
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economy from 1989 to 1996, which allows for construction of business units that are more 
comparable across firms.  This data actually indicates a diversification premium that is robust 
with variations in measures of excess value and diversification.  A second study by Villalonga 
(2004b) also causes the diversification discount to disappear, this time when econometric 
methods of casual inference are used.  Here she compares the performance of three different 
techniques from previous literature that seek to establish causation from non-experimental data.9   
All three of the methods show no indication of a diversification discount as it is traditionally 
defined. 
Mansi and Reeb (2002) argue that the diversification discount discussed in previous 
literature stems from risk-reducing by corporations that choose to diversify.  The data used is 
from the Disclosure WorldScope database and includes 2,856 firms from 1988 to 1999.  The 
authors’ hypothesis is supported by the following three findings:  equity holder losses in 
diversification are related to firm leverage, all-equity firms do not exhibit a diversification 
discount, and using book value of debt in the measure of excess value creates bias that is related 
to diversification.  They also find that, using their data, the relation between diversification and 
firm excess value is not significant. 
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000) explore the distortions between decisions made 
within the organization and decisions made in the marketplace.  Instead of considering a division 
manager and headquarters, the authors consider two division managers battling for resources that 
can be given to the manager or transferred to another division by headquarters.  The effect of this 
struggle on firm value is the basis for analysis.  The analysis reveals that funds will flow from 
divisions with poor opportunities to divisions with good opportunities.  However, this is not the 
                                                 
9 See Dehejia and Wahba (1999), Abadie and Imbens (2002), and Heckman (1979). 
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case all the time.  In a diversified firm, resources may have to be allocated to support certain 
divisions, even if they are performing poorly.  Therefore, when diversity is low, transfers are 
made in the appropriate direction and firms trade at a premium (positive excess value) relative to 
single-segment firms.  When diversity increases, the firm starts trading at a discount and the 
discount increases as diversity increases. 
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Table 2.1  Summary of Reviewed Diversification Discount Literature 
Author and Year Data Summary 
Lang and Stulz, 1994 Compustat, 1978 to 1988 Using Tobin's q as a measure of firm value the authors find a diversification discount.  
Also, the magnitude of the diversification discount is influenced by industry effects. 
Berger and Ofek, 1995 Compustat, 1986 to 1991 Using an excess value measure of firm value, the authors find a diversification 
discount. For related diversification, the value loss is much less. 
Servaes, 1996 Compustat, 1961 to 1976 Servaes finds that there is a diversification discount in the 1960s but it declines to 
nearly zero in the early and mid-1970s.  When the diversification discount was large 
(1961-1970) the firms with high insider ownership resisted diversification but when 
the diversification discount declined, these firms quickly diversified. 
Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales, 2000 Compustat, 1980 to 1993 Authors analyze how inefficient investment influences firm value.  When diversity is 
low, transfers are made in the appropriate direction and firms trade at a premium 
(positive excess value) relative to single-segment firms.  When diversity increases, the 
firm starts trading at a discount and the discount increases as diversity increases. 
Lamont and Polk, 2001 Compustat, 1979 to 1997 Expected returns are higher in firms with a diversification discount than in premium 
firms.  Authors find that about half of the variance in excess value can be attributed to 
differences in future cash flow between diversified and single-segment firms.  The 
other half is due to differences in future returns and covariance between returns and 
cash flows. 
Campa and Kedia, 2002 Compustat, 1978 to 1996 The authors find that the correlation between diversification and firm value is not 
causal. 
Denis, Denis, and Yost, 2002 Compustat, 1984 to 1997 Authors find a diversification discount associated with global diversification. 
Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002 Compustat, 1980 to 1995 The authors contend that diversified firms tend to purchase already discounted firms 
which produces the diversification discount.  Their analysis reveals that if 
characteristics of the firm being acquired are taken into account, nearly all of the 
diversification discount can be explained. 
Mansi and Reeb, 2002 Worldscope, 1988 to 1999 According to the analysis done by Mansi and Reeb, the relation between 
diversification and firm excess value is not significant. 
Gomes and Lividan, 2004  Authors use a theoretical framework to study the existence of a diversification 
discount.  They find that expanding firms are less productive than other firms and 
experience productivity loss after expansion.  Also, differences in size account for part 
of the productivity and valuation differences between diversified and focused firms.  
The diversification discount can be obtained using their theoretical framework.   
Villalonga, 2004a Compustat and BITS, 
1989 to 1996 
Villalonga hypothesizes that the diversification discount could be due to the 
inappropriateness of the segment data that is used to measure it in most previous 
studies.  BITS data actually indicates a diversification premium that is robust with 
variations in measures of excess value and diversification. 
Villalonga, 2004b Compustat, 1978 to 1997 Econometric methods of casual inference are used which cause the diversification to 
disappear.  She compares the performance of three different techniques from previous 
literature that seek to establish causation from non-experimental data.  All three of the 
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methods show no indication of a diversification discount as it is traditionally defined. 
Katchova, 2005 ARMS, 1999 to 2001 Katchova uses farm survey data and finds a diversification discount in both 
crop/livestock diversified farms and crop diversified farms. 
Laeven and Levine, 2005 Bankscope, 1998 to 2002 Using a variety of statistical methods and instrument variable specifications, a 
diversification discount is found in all cases in their sample of financial institutions. 
2.3 Family-Controlled Firms and Firm Performance 
Family control is an important firm effect variable in the food processing, wholesale grocery, and 
retail supermarket sectors.  The food economy has many companies controlled by families.  
Anderson and Reeb (2003) report that 43 percent of all food processing firms are controlled by 
families.  Villalonga and Amit (2005) report that 42 percent of food processing firms, 36 percent 
of grocery wholesale firms, 55 percent of retail grocery firms, and zero percent of restaurant 
firms are family controlled.  Villalonga and Amit (2005) define family controlled firm as those 
firms in which one or more family members are officers or directors or own more than 5 percent 
of the firm’s equity. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003) use data from S&P 500 firms in 1992 to 1999 to find that 
family firms are significantly better performers than non-family firms when a profitability-based 
measure of firm performance (ROA) is used.  Their results suggest that firms controlled by 
founding families are more profitable than dispersed-ownership firms.  They also find that 
profitability is even greater when a family member is the CEO.  One explanation Anderson and 
Reeb offer for this finding is that family members understand the business and feel a strong sense 
of responsibility for its performance. 
Boland, Golden, and Tsoodle (2006) found that ownership structure (e.g, family 
controlled firms and cooperatives), governance variables, and income distribution methods were 
significant determinants of food processing firm profitability over the 1992 to 2002 time period 
using Compustat data.  Greater performance is linked with a greater number of independent 
directors and firms that pay cash dividends or cash patronage refunds. 
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2.4 Contributions to Current Literature 
The contribution of this research is to further refine the diversification binary variable used in the 
finance literature.  More specifically, this variable is disaggregated into variables that measure 
vertical integration upstream or downstream in the food value chain, horizontal integration 
across industries in a sector, and unrelated diversification into any industry outside the food 
economy. 
A study looking specifically at diversification and integration in the four distinct sectors 
of the food economy does not exist in current literature.  Also, while vertical integration is 
widely discussed in the literature, much of the discussions are conceptual or theoretical 
discussions as opposed to empirical investigations. This is because true measures of vertical 
integration can be difficult to construct and therefore proxies are used.  Those studies that do 
provide empirical evidence focus mostly on issues such as transaction costs, foreclosures and 
determinants of vertical integration (Bhuyan 2001).  Therefore, it is a useful contribution to the 
literature to investigate how vertical integration (and diversification) affects firm value in the 
food economy.  As agricultural economists, it is useful to analyze the impact of diversification 
and integration strategies on food economy firms because they have some unique characteristics.  
It is also useful to note if there are differences among the retail, processing, wholesaling and 
restaurant sectors of the food industry.  And, in contrast to previous studies in the agricultural 
economics literature, this study uses a measure of firm value that accounts for the value derived 
from specific business segments. 
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2.5 Summary of Literature 
This chapter has described the relevant literature on diversification and integration.  The 
contribution provided by this research is to study an important sector of the U.S. economy which 
has unique characteristics and has four distinct sectors.  An approach for measuring performance 
as a function of firm effects, industry effects and a diversification/integration variable has been 
identified as a useful way to test for a premium or discount.  And, as is evident from the 
literature discussed above, a database exists that is commonly used in studies of this type. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from the literature review above.  First, papers have 
studied the impact of diversification on firm profitability but not many have studied the impact 
of vertical and horizontal integration.  In general, across a wide range of data and time periods, 
undiversified firms have performed better than diversified firms.  Various explanations have 
been offered for this, including inability to transfer specialized skills to other industries (Porter 
1980, Wernerfelt and Montgomery 1988), not taking advantage of the efficiencies that come 
with diversification (Comment and Jarrell 1995), and lack of effective corporate control and 
monitoring mechanisms (Berger and Ofek 1995). 
The excess value measure proposed by Berger and Ofek has been used and adapted in 
several different ways since it was first published in 1995.  It remains the most widely used 
method to assign values to segments based on the financial information companies are required 
to report by segment. 
Traditionally Tobin’s q has been used to assign value to a firm but in this study excess 
value for firm valuation is used to avoid some of the problems with Tobin’s q that Berger and 
Ofek (1995) point out.  Specifically, because Tobin’s q requires calculating a firm’s replacement 
value, assumptions about depreciation and inflation rates must be made.  Also, studies using 
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Tobin’s q usually do not adjust for industry effects even though there is large variation across 
industries and industry effects have been found to be significant in explaining the diversification 
discount.  When studying diversification using segment data and Tobin’s q, it becomes even 
more difficult to adjust for industry effects because the components of the Tobin’s q formula 
cannot be computed from the segment data companies are required to report. 
The literature review suggests that variables measuring firm effects and industry effects 
are important when explaining performance.  The literature also suggests that it is important to 
account for endogeneity concerns, industry classification and data measurement. 
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CHAPTER 3 - Methodology 
To determine whether a premium or discount exists for integration or diversification, a method 
must be identified to assign value to a firm and its segments.  In this case, this firm value 
measure is called excess value.  This chapter discusses the methodology, data, and estimation 
procedures for modeling this excess value as a function of firm effect variables and binary 
variables to indicate diversification and integration strategies.  The effect of these binary 
variables is modeled as both an exogenous and endogenous decision. 
3.1 Excess Value 
Berger and Ofek’s (1995) excess value calculation method is used in this research to compare the 
actual value of a firm to the imputed value of all of the segments of a firm.  A segment is defined 
by a single four-digit US Department of Commerce SIC code.10  Since 1977, firms have been 
required to report net sales, assets, depreciation, capital expenditures, and earnings before 
interest and taxes (EBIT) by segment (Berger and Ofek 1995).  For the purposes of this study, a 
firm is considered to be diversified or integrated if it must report under two or more separate 
four-digit SIC codes.  A firm reports under a specific SIC code if its sales, assets, or EBIT are at 
least 10% of the firm total. 
In each industry, there are firms who operate in only one segment.  In other words, they 
report under only one four-digit SIC code.  For these firms, the median ratio of total capital 
(market value of common equity plus book value of debt) to assets is calculated as 
                                                 
10 Appendix A provides the SIC classifications, codes, and names used in this study. 
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where Vij is total capital for firm i in segment j, aij is total assets for firm i in segment j, nj is the 
number of firms in segment j, and m is the firm with the median ratio.11  The median ratios are 
calculated using the narrowest SIC group that contains three or more firms.  For processing 
firms, 53% of the median calculations use four digit SIC codes, 42% use three digit SIC codes, 
and 5% use two digit SIC codes.  For wholesales firms, 42% of the median calculations use four 
digit SIC codes and 52% use three digit SIC codes.12  For retail and restaurant firms, 99% of the 
median calculations use four digit SIC codes and 1% use three digit SIC codes.  An imputed 
value for each segment of each diversified firm can then be defined, using the ratio in (1), as 
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where IVij is the imputed value for segment j of firm i and aij is assets for firm i in segment j.  
The imputed value for the entire firm including all J of its segments is then 
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where IVi is the imputed value for firm i.  So the excess value, EV, of firm i is 
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where Vi is total capital for firm i and IVi is the sum of imputed values for each segment of the 
firm.13   If Vi is greater (less) than IVi then excess value is positive (negative) and the value of the 
                                                 
11 As in Berger and Ofek (1995) and other studies using this excess value calculation method, the median ratio is 
used instead of the mean ratio to account for skewness in the data distributions. 
12 The percentages for wholesale firms do not sum to 100% because a small number of medians in this sector had to 
be calculated using data from only one firm. 
13 A numerical example using equations (1) – (4) is shown in Appendix C. 
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firm is greater (less) than the sum of the imputed value of its segments.  Equations (1) to (4) are 
also calculated using sales in place of assets.  Because assets and sales for each firm are 
multiplied by the median ratio of total capital to assets, these two accounting items are referred 
to as “multipliers”.  Two different multipliers are used to calculate excess value because previous 
literature has indicated that, if managers are responsible for reporting segment data, they may 
have an incentive to misstate it.  Segment assets are specifically identified with each segment so 
it is difficult to misstate them but managers can use discretion when allocating sales between 
segments.  Therefore, sales are vulnerable to manipulation (Berger and Ofek 1995). 
Unallocated assets can become a problem when making the excess value calculations 
described above.  Therefore, if the sum of segment assets differs from the sum of the firm’s 
assets by more than 75% then the firm is excluded from the analysis that uses the asset 
multiplier.  If the difference is within 75%, the imputed value is adjusted up or down by the 
percent difference between the sum of the segment assets and the total firm assets.  The sales 
multiplier is adjusted in a similar manner.  This type of adjustment is also used by Berger and 
Ofek (1995). 
After all firm calculations are complete, outliers are removed for each of the two excess 
value measures.  Outliers are defined as those excess values that are five standard deviations 
above or below the mean for each of the multipliers.  Table 3.1 shows the median and mean 
excess values broken out by multiplier, sector of the food economy and diversification status as 
well as the number of observations in each subset.14
The single segment median excess values for processing firms is zero as is expected 
because it is the log of a value that should be close to one for single segment firms.  The median 
                                                 
14 Removing excess value outliers and adjusting for unallocated sales and assets resulted in a decrease in the number 
of observations from 5,542 to 4,079. 
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excess value for multi-segment processing firms is -0.7076 using the asset multiplier and -0.6675 
using the sales multiplier.  The mean excess values for processing firms are -0.5864 using the 
asset multiplier and -0.5705 using the sales multiplier. 
Table 3.1 suggests that diversification and/or integration decreases value most noticeably 
in the wholesale sector and least in the processing sector.  But, these are only preliminary 
indications of the effect of diversification and/or integration on firm value.  The next section 
examines this relationship further.  Table 3.1 indicates that excess value is significantly less in 
the food economy sector than the entire U.S. economy, as studies by Berger and Ofek (1995) and 
Campa and Kedia (2002) have found mean excess values between -0.05 and -0.16 using data 
from the economy as a whole.  It should be noted that each of these studies used different time 
periods.  This study of the food economy uses data from a longer time period relative to any of 
these previous studies and encompasses several significant events in the food economy, 
including the farm crisis of the mid-1980’s, growth in the late 1990’s caused by exports, and the 
food safety issues in the 2000’s. 
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Table 3.1  Mean and Median Excess Values and Number of Observations for Each Type of 
Food Economy Firm 
 Processing Wholesale Retail Restaurant 
Median     
Asset Multiplier     
   Single-segment firms 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   Multi-segment firms -0.7076 -1.0192 -0.6525 -0.6426 
Sales Multiplier     
   Single-segment firms 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
   Multi-segment firms -0.6675 -1.4285 -0.7750 -0.5889 
Mean     
Asset Multiplier     
   Single-segment firms 0.0429 -0.0095 0.0795 0.0578 
   Multi-segment firms -0.5864 -0.8581 -0.6815 -0.6506 
Sales Multiplier     
   Single-segment firms 0.0158 -0.2018 -0.0640 0.0381 
   Multi-segment firms -0.5705 -1.2665 -0.8737 -0.5986 
Number of Observationsa     
   Single-segment firms 1,481 134 400 1,313 
   Multi-segment firms 474 113 71 93 
aThe data set contains 4,079 total observations. 
Tables 3.2 to 3.5 show the mean, median, and standard deviation of the excess value 
calculations by year.  The mean values are graphed in figures 3.1 to 3.4.  In this sample, the 
variability of the mean values increases when the number of observations decreases.  The 
greatest variation is in the wholesale sector but this is also the sector with the fewest number of 
observations.  As is evident throughout the subsequent analysis, wholesale firms have had very 
variable profitability over the time period studied.  This is partly due to the structural changes 
that were discussed in Chapter 1. 
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Table 3.2  Mean, Median and Standard Deviation of Excess Value for the Processing Sector 
by Year and Multiplier 
  Asset Multiplier Sales Multiplier 
Year Na Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
1983 32 -0.055 0.000 0.594 -0.148 -0.062 0.793 
1984 47 -0.051 0.000 0.711 -0.043 0.000 0.914 
1985 49 -0.092 -0.037 0.641 -0.082 0.000 0.756 
1986 50 -0.054 0.000 0.539 -0.172 -0.098 0.649 
1987 56 -0.069 -0.027 0.546 -0.031 0.000 0.669 
1988 58 -0.185 -0.116 0.586 -0.074 -0.086 0.801 
1989 61 -0.096 0.000 0.618 -0.048 0.000 0.751 
1990 61 -0.092 0.000 0.701 -0.178 0.000 0.815 
1991 63 -0.091 0.000 0.759 -0.102 -0.038 0.904 
1992 70 -0.050 -0.028 0.659 -0.016 0.000 0.748 
1993 80 -0.143 -0.080 0.705 -0.159 -0.097 0.730 
1994 87 -0.074 -0.050 0.660 -0.130 -0.040 0.673 
1995 96 0.117 0.001 0.624 -0.125 0.000 0.684 
1996 101 -0.091 -0.016 0.593 -0.143 0.000 0.584 
1997 109 -0.030 0.000 0.680 -0.072 0.000 0.678 
1998 122 0.010 0.000 0.728 -0.015 0.000 0.724 
1999 124 -0.102 -0.020 0.677 -0.174 -0.075 0.708 
2000 127 -0.069 -0.026 0.709 -0.055 -0.019 0.761 
2001 127 -0.156 -0.010 0.717 -0.182 -0.072 0.729 
2002 120 -0.203 -0.133 0.656 -0.171 -0.095 0.736 
2003 119 -0.184 -0.086 0.815 -0.177 -0.138 0.851 
2004 118 -0.195 -0.178 0.680 -0.233 -0.096 0.723 
2005 78 -0.217 -0.193 0.735 -0.251 -0.035 0.834 
aN is the number of observations in each year. 
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Table 3.3  Mean, Median and Standard Deviation of Excess Value for the Wholesale Sector 
by Year and Multiplier 
  Asset Multiplier Sales Multiplier 
Year Na Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
1983 5 -0.048 0.000 0.788 -0.270 0.000 0.998 
1984 7 -0.443 -0.374 0.540 -0.584 -0.413 0.618 
1985 7 -0.460 -0.288 0.453 -0.601 -0.343 0.593 
1986 7 0.024 -0.054 0.659 -0.292 -0.509 0.557 
1987 7 0.028 -0.067 0.694 -0.338 -0.695 0.738 
1988 8 -0.292 -0.333 0.459 -0.470 -0.485 0.470 
1989 7 -0.551 -0.969 0.737 -0.628 -1.170 1.510 
1990 7 -0.537 -0.785 0.871 -1.557 -2.105 1.135 
1991 7 -0.276 -0.744 1.198 -0.845 -1.279 1.137 
1992 7 -0.413 -0.231 0.856 -0.831 -1.111 1.010 
1993 11 -0.552 -0.308 0.813 -0.727 -0.389 1.159 
1994 14 -0.260 0.000 0.875 -0.425 -0.175 1.005 
1995 14 -0.420 -0.040 0.878 -0.514 -0.234 1.137 
1996 15 -0.502 -0.069 0.855 -0.537 -0.739 1.255 
1997 16 -0.245 -0.057 0.837 -0.379 -0.349 1.489 
1998 17 -0.721 -0.891 0.846 -0.374 -1.276 1.801 
1999 18 -0.168 -0.286 1.096 -0.719 -1.378 1.438 
2000 18 -0.505 -0.977 1.037 -0.703 -0.722 1.222 
2001 18 -1.117 -0.910 0.907 -1.558 -1.842 1.287 
2002 11 0.222 0.176 0.959 -1.361 -1.283 0.965 
2003 11 -0.206 -0.303 1.000 -0.376 -0.159 0.916 
2004 9 -0.374 -0.591 0.795 -0.750 -0.699 0.856 
2005 6 -0.424 -0.335 0.869 -0.700 -0.465 0.814 
aN is the number of observations in each year. 
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Table 3.4  Mean, Median and Standard Deviation of Excess Value for the Retail Sector by 
Year and Multiplier 
  Asset Multiplier Sales Multiplier 
Year Na Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
1983 8 -0.114 0.001 0.491 0.069 -0.001 0.780 
1984 13 0.095 -0.002 0.421 0.031 -0.085 0.678 
1985 13 0.122 -0.024 0.476 0.038 -0.008 0.675 
1986 13 0.127 -0.001 0.404 0.095 -0.012 0.634 
1987 13 -0.141 0.000 0.461 0.069 -0.020 0.646 
1988 13 0.126 0.005 0.371 0.133 0.119 0.516 
1989 13 0.154 0.019 0.347 0.035 0.011 0.488 
1990 16 -0.017 -0.002 0.519 -0.050 0.000 0.670 
1991 18 0.032 0.021 0.521 -0.083 -0.096 0.576 
1992 18 0.157 0.005 0.664 0.024 -0.038 0.724 
1993 19 0.075 -0.012 0.702 -0.046 0.000 0.756 
1994 20 -0.197 -0.062 0.484 -0.178 -0.024 0.636 
1995 23 -0.167 -0.061 0.807 -0.213 0.000 0.850 
1996 27 0.086 -0.055 0.491 -0.176 -0.010 0.643 
1997 29 -0.012 -0.026 0.635 -0.316 -0.002 0.775 
1998 29 0.028 -0.014 0.774 -0.237 -0.052 0.886 
1999 30 -0.196 -0.071 0.678 -0.364 -0.290 0.876 
2000 31 -0.124 -0.276 0.731 -0.288 -0.355 0.797 
2001 30 -0.020 -0.086 0.591 -0.352 -0.199 0.759 
2002 28 -0.318 -0.341 0.720 -0.448 -0.326 0.952 
2003 26 -0.190 -0.126 0.703 -0.289 -0.368 0.712 
2004 25 -0.123 -0.054 0.696 -0.254 -0.175 0.726 
2005 16 0.015 -0.010 0.742 -0.287 -0.138 0.973 
aN is the number of observations in each year. 
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Table 3.5  Mean, Median and Standard Deviation of Excess Value for the Restaurant 
Sector by Year and Multiplier 
  Asset Multiplier Sales Multiplier 
Year Na Mean Median Std. Dev. Mean Median Std. Dev. 
1983 14 0.174 -0.009 0.619 -0.036 -0.024 0.947 
1984 23 -0.049 -0.008 0.562 -0.087 -0.113 0.645 
1985 27 0.052 -0.023 0.603 -0.023 -0.134 0.677 
1986 31 0.085 -0.002 0.622 -0.006 -0.162 0.721 
1987 32 0.061 0.000 0.663 0.025 0.000 0.692 
1988 34 0.076 0.000 0.643 -0.092 -0.004 0.611 
1989 37 0.093 0.000 0.740 -0.021 0.000 0.758 
1990 40 0.126 0.043 0.737 0.003 0.021 0.837 
1991 48 0.183 0.000 0.803 0.278 0.000 0.961 
1992 55 0.057 0.022 0.759 0.237 0.012 0.825 
1993 60 0.087 -0.011 0.679 0.238 -0.014 0.801 
1994 62 -0.018 -0.009 0.634 0.007 -0.057 0.702 
1995 72 -0.002 -0.028 0.679 -0.129 -0.050 0.803 
1996 83 0.048 -0.005 0.673 -0.009 -0.017 0.814 
1997 87 0.033 -0.004 0.563 0.108 0.000 0.746 
1998 95 -0.002 -0.043 0.657 0.024 0.000 0.776 
1999 98 -0.015 -0.060 0.657 -0.101 -0.113 0.777 
2000 100 -0.040 -0.069 0.656 -0.129 -0.061 0.749 
2001 94 -0.037 -0.040 0.690 -0.073 -0.050 0.808 
2002 92 -0.025 -0.024 0.734 -0.047 -0.024 0.841 
2003 79 -0.082 -0.015 0.644 -0.052 -0.004 0.813 
2004 79 -0.099 -0.142 0.596 -0.014 -0.073 0.742 
2005 64 0.001 0.000 0.584 -0.043 -0.056 0.720 
aN is the number of observations in each year. 
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Figure 3.1  Excess Value for the Processing Sector for Each Multiplier 
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Figure 3.2  Excess Value for the Wholesale Sector for Each Multiplier 
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Figure 3.3  Excess Value for the Retail Sector for Each Multiplier 
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Figure 3.4  Excess Value for the Restaurant Sector for Each Multiplier 
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3.2 Conceptual Model 
This section describes the conceptual models that are used to analyze the impact of firm effects 
and diversification and integration strategy on excess value.  In the first section, the 
diversification or integration strategy is an exogenously determined variable.  In the second 
section, Heckman’s two step procedure is used to test the endogeneity of the diversification and 
integration binary variables. 
3.2.1 Exogenous Integration and Diversification Model 
The excess value measure shown in equation (4) is used in the following model to further 
analyze the effect of diversification and integration on firm value, where diversification and 
integration are exogenously determined.  This means that the model shows how certain firm 
effects, including diversification and integration, influence excess value, but not how these 
characteristics influence the diversification or integration decision.  The model is estimated for 
the four sectors of the food economy separately and is defined as 
(5)    EVi,t = α + βDi,t  + γXi,t + εi,t 
where EVi,t is the excess value of firm i in year t and Di,t is a matrix of binary variables equal to 
one if firm i in year t is integrated or diversified according to the definitions given in Table 3.6 
and 0 otherwise.  Xi,t is a vector of firm effects for firm i in year t, including the ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales, net margin, leverage, firm control, and assets.  These effects differ by firm 
due to managerial strategies employed by the firm. All variables in equation (5) including the 
variables in the Xi,t vector are defined in Table 3.2.  The parameters to be estimated are α, β, and 
γ and ε is the error term. 
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The ratio of capital expenditures to sales, net margin, and assets have been widely used in 
previous literature as explanatory variables in models using excess value.  The ratio of capital 
expenditures to sales is an indication of firm growth because it indicates the change in capital 
spending as sales increase.  Net margin is the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
to sales and is a measure of firm profitability.  The natural log of total assets is used as a measure 
of firm size.  Increased growth, profitability and size are expected to have a positive effect on the 
excess value of a firm.  A quadratic size term is also added because the effect of size on excess 
value may be nonlinear due to decreasing marginal returns (Campa and Kedia 2002). 
Equation (5) also includes variables for leverage and control.  Leverage in this study is 
measured by the debt to asset ratio for each firm and is included because leverage is generally 
thought to have a negative effect on firm value.  The variable to indicate control is included due 
to the finding by Anderson and Reeb (2003) that family-controlled firms are more profitable than 
non-family controlled firms.  The variable for control is binary and equals one if the founding 
family controls 25 percent or more of the governance of the firm and 0 otherwise.  Family 
control is an important characteristic of firms in the food economy.  Governance, which is a 
measure of whether a firm is controlled by family members or non-family members, is a firm 
effect variable.  Family firms were identified using corporate histories from Hoovers, The 
Corporate Library, individual company records including SEC documents, and online data from 
Anderson and Reeb. 
The binary variables (Di,t) defined in Table 3.6 were initially assigned into twenty-three 
different, non-overlapping categories based on the diversification and/or integration strategy they 
were pursuing in a particular year.  Due to the small number of firms in some of the categories, 
the variables were eventually aggregated into the nine binary variables shown in Table 3.6.  The 
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original category definitions and aggregation details are given in Appendix D along with the 
number of firms in each binary variables category.  Notice that D9,i,t only applies to processing 
firms because there are no firms in the data in the other sectors that are integrated into 
production.  But, integration into production is a widely discussed vertical integration issue in the 
food economy so this binary variable was included. 
For clarification purposes, it is useful to discuss some examples of how the binary 
variables are assigned.  Sara Lee is an example of a processing firm that is vertically integrated 
into wholesale (D2,i,t).  So, in the case of Sara Lee, the binary variable for vertical integration into 
the wholesale sector (D2,i,t) is a one and all of the other binary variables (D3,i,t through D9i,t) are 
zero.  Notice that vertical integration into processing (D1,i,t) does not apply in this case. 
Sysco is an example of a wholesale firm that is pursuing horizontal integration (D6,i,t ) 
into other forms of food wholesale besides general grocery wholesale.  So, in the case of Sysco, 
the binary variable for horizontal integration (D6,i,t ) is a one and all of the other binary variables 
(D1,i,t, D3,i,t, D4,i,t, D5,i,t, D7,i,t, D8,i,t) are zero.  Notice that the binary variables that indicate vertical 
integration into wholesale (D2,i,t) and vertical integration into production (D9,i,t) do not apply for 
wholesale firms. 
Coles Myers is an example of a retail firm pursuing unrelated diversification (D5,i,t ) in 
the form of computer services. So, in the case of Coles Myer, the binary variable for unrelated 
diversification (D5,i,t ) is a one and all of the other binary variables (D1,i,t, D2,i,t, D4,i,t, D6,i,t, D7,i,t, 
D8,i,t) are zero.  Notice that the binary variables that indicate vertical integration into retail (D3,i,t) 
and vertical integration into production (D9,i,t) do not apply for retail firms. 
Yum Brands (owner of KFC, Taco Bell, Pizza Hut, Long John Silver’s and A&W 
restaurants) is an example of a single segment restaurant firm.  So, in the case of Yum Brands, 
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the binary variable for single segment firms (D8,i,t ) is a one and all of the other binary variables 
(D1,i,t, D2,i,t, D3,i,t, D5,i,t, D6,i,t, D7,i,t) are zero.  Notice that the binary variables that indicate vertical 
integration into restaurants (D4,i,t) and vertical integration into production (D9,i,t) do not apply for 
restaurant firms. 
Table 3.6  Variable Definitions 
Symbol Variable Definition 
EVi,t Excess Value Excess value 
X1,i,t Ln(Assets) Natural log of total assets for firm i in year t 
X2,i,t Profitability EBIT divided by sales for firm i in year t 
X3,i,t Growth  Capital expenditures divided by sales for firm i in year t 
X4,i,t Leverage  Debt to asset ratio for firm i in year t 
X5,i,t Ln(Assets)2 Natural log of total assets squared for firm i in year t 
X6,i,t Family control Binary variable that equals one if firm i is family-controlled in year 
t and 0 otherwise 
D1,i,t Vertical 
integration - 
processing 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is vertically integrated into 
processing in year t and 0 otherwise  
D2,i,t Vertical 
integration - 
wholesale 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is vertically integrated into 
wholesale in year t and 0 otherwise  
D3,i,t Vertical 
integration - 
retail 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is vertically integrated into 
retail in year t and 0 otherwise  
D4,i,t Vertical 
integration - 
restaurant 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is vertically integrated into 
restaurants in year t and 0 otherwise  
D5,i,t Unrelated 
diversification 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is diversified into unrelated 
activities in year t and 0 otherwise 
D6,i,t Horizontal 
integration 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is horizontally integrated in 
year t and 0 otherwise 
D7,i,t Unrelated 
diversification 
and horizontal 
integration 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is diversified into unrelated 
activities and horizontally integrated in year t and 0 otherwise 
D8,i,t Single 
segment firms 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is a single segment firm in 
year t and 0 otherwise 
D9,i,t Vertical 
Integration - 
productiona 
Binary variable that equals one if firm i is vertically integrated into 
production in year t and 0 otherwise 
aThis variable only applies to processing firms. 
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3.2.2 Endogenous Integration and Diversification Model 
As discussed by Campa and Kedia (2002) and Laeven and Levine (2005), certain firm and 
industry effects may both lead a firm to diversify or integrate and affect firm value.  In other 
words, as stated by Campa and Kedia (2002), “firms that choose to diversify [or integrate] are 
not a random sample of firms.” (p.1747)  In this case, Di,t and εi,t in equation (5) might be 
correlated.  This would incorrectly attribute a discount or premium to the diversification or 
integration itself and not the underlying firm characteristics that caused the firm to pursue such a 
strategy.  To account for these underlying firm and industry characteristics, diversification and 
integration are endogenous in the following model and Heckman’s (1979) two-stage procedure is 
used to control for the self-selection of firms that diversify.15  As is done by Campa and Kedia 
(2002), in the first step, probit models of firm’s diversification and integration decisions are 
estimated as a function of firm effects in the following form 
(6)    Di,t* = δXi,t + µi,t 
(7)    Di,t = 1 if Di,t* > 0 
(8)    Di,t = 0 if Di,t* ≤ 0 
where Di,t* is an unobserved latent variable, Xi,t is a vector of firm characteristics that may affect 
the decision to pursue a diversification or integration strategy, δ is a vector of parameters to be 
estimated, and µi,t is the error term.  Assume that εi,t from (5) and µi,t from (6) have a bivariate 
normal distribution with means zero, standard deviation σe, and correlation ρ.  Therefore, the 
expected excess value conditional on the firm being diversified or integrated can be estimated as 
(9)    E(EVi,t|Di,t = 1)= α + δXi,t + β + E( εi,t|Di,t = 1) 
                                                 
15 The use of instrumental variables is another way to test for endogeneity.  However, examination of the available 
Compustat data revealed no instrumental variables that are thought to be highly correlated with diversification and 
integration.  Thus, instrumental variables are not used in this analysis. 
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where 
(10)     E( εi,t|Di,t = 1) = ρσeλ1(δXi,t) 
and 
(11)    ( ) ( )( )ti
ti
ti X
X
X
,
,
,1 δ
δφδλ Φ=  
where ( ).φ  and  are the standard normal density and cumulative density functions, 
respectively.  The expected excess value conditional on the firm not being diversified or 
integrated can be estimated as 
( ).Φ
(12)   E(EVi,t|Di,t = 0) = α + δXi,t + β + E( εi,t|Di,t=0) 
where 
(13)    E( εi,t|Di,t = 0) = ρσeλ2(δXi,t) 
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Therefore the difference between the value of single segment and diversified or integrated firms 
is  
(15)  E(EVi,t|Di,t = 1) - E(EVi,t|Di,t = 0) = β +ρσe 
( )
( ) ( )( )titi
ti
XX
X
,,
,
1 δδ
δφ
Φ−Φ  
The estimates of δ from the first step probit model are used to estimate λ1 and λ2 for use in the 
following OLS model which becomes the second stage of the regression procedure 
(16)  EVi,t = α + βDi,t  + γXi,t + ς[λ1( Xi,t) * Di,t + λ2( Xi,t) * (1-Di,t)] + ηi,t δˆ δˆ
   = α + βDi,t  + γXi,t + ςλ + ηi,t 
where ς = ρσe.  The right hand side of equation (15) is the ordinary least squares coefficient, β, 
which will be biased downward (upward) if εi,t from (5) and µi,t from (6) are negatively 
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(positively) correlated.  This correlation, ρ, then determines the sign of ς.  The variable, λ, is 
commonly referred to as the self-selection parameter because it indicates whether diversified or 
integrated firms are a random sample or if this strategic decision is correlated with the firm 
effects in equation (5) (Campa and Kedia 2002). 
3.3 Data 
The data used in this study are taken from Standard and Poor’s Compustat database and include 
data from 416 food business firms from 1983 to 2005.  The data are unique in that they include 
financial information for the individual business segments as well as the firm as a whole.  The 
availability of segment data as well as the wide range of available years of data is the primary 
reason for using Compustat as opposed to other data sources discussed in the previous chapter.  
As mentioned previously, the segment information includes net sales, assets, EBIT, depreciation, 
and capital expenditures.  Segment data information was first collected by Compustat in 1983 
which is why 1983 is the earliest year used in this study.  This data has been used in previous 
research on the food economy by Schumacher and Boland (2005) and Boland, Golden, and 
Tsoodle (2006) and in previous research on the whole U.S. economy by Berger and Ofek (1995) 
and Campa and Kedia (2002).  Table 3.7 provides means, medians, and standard deviations for 
the independent variables in equation (5) as well as the number of segments.
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Table 3.7  Mean, Median, and Standard Deviation of Firm Characteristics for Each Type of Food Economy Firm 
 Processing Wholesale Retail Restaurant 
 Mean Med.a SDb Mean Med. SD Mean Med. SD Mean Med. SD 
Natural Log of Assets             
   Single-segment firms 19.086 19.022 2.338 17.929 17.829 2.518 20.373 20.378 1.678 18.060 18.014 2.004 
   Multi-segment firms 20.844 21.226 2.363 19.974 20.362 1.800 21.099 20.792 1.484 18.833 19.089 1.575 
EBIT to Sales Ratio             
   Single-segment firms 0.065 0.070 0.105 -0.010 0.023 0.123 0.027 0.029 0.024 0.037 0.050 0.098 
   Multi-segment firms 0.083 0.085 0.071 0.004 0.021 0.079 0.028 0.033 0.017 0.059 0.059 0.059 
Capital Expenditures to 
Sales Ratio 
            
   Single-segment firms 0.063 0.042 0.080 0.028 0.014 0.050 0.034 0.027 0.034 0.106 0.081 0.116 
   Multi-segment firms 0.053 0.044 0.046 0.033 0.015 0.129 0.034 0.032 0.017 0.063 0.054 0.038 
Debt to Asset Ratio             
   Single-segment firms 0.263 0.247 0.215 0.286 0.251 0.250 0.301 0.282 0.225 0.320 0.252 0.402 
   Multi-segment firms 0.272 0.258 0.165 0.318 0.311 0.132 0.335 0.323 0.167 0.299 0.217 0.287 
Number of Segments             
   Single-segment firms 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.000 
   Multi-segment firms 2.766 2.000 0.979 2.274 2.000 0.468 2.352 2.000 0.635 2.247 2.000 0.503 
aMed. denotes median. 
bSD denotes standard deviation. 
 
3.4 Empirical Model 
This section describes the econometric procedures used to estimate the conceptual models 
developed in the previous section. 
3.4.1 Exogenous Integration and Diversification Model 
The conceptual model discussed in section 3.2.1 above was estimated in SAS® using PROC 
SYSLIN.  The model is estimated in the following form for each of the four food economy 
sectors using seemingly unrelated regression (SUR): 
(17) EVi,t = α + β1D1,i,t + β2D2,i,t + β3D3,i,t + β4D4,i,t + β5D5,i,t + β6D6,i,t + β7D7,i,t + β9D9,i,t 
+ γ1X1,i,t + γ2X2,i,t + γ3X3,i,t + γ4X4,i,t + γ5X5,i,t + γ6X6,i,t + εi,t 
where α, β, and γ are parameters to be estimated and ε is the error term.  All the variables in 
equation (17) are defined in Table 3.6.16  D8,i,t is used as the default variable for the 
diversification and integration dummy variables.  The SUR methodology is used to account for 
any correlation that may exist among the error terms in the regression equations for the four food 
economy firm sectors.17
3.4.2 Endogenous Integration and Diversification Model 
As discussed in the previous section, the second model uses Heckman’s two stage procedure to 
control for self selection.  LIMDEP contains a program for this procedure so it was utilized in the 
estimation of the following model.  The probit model in the first stage is estimated as 
(19)  Di,t = α + δ1X1,i,t + δ2X2,i,t + δ3X3,i,t + δ4X4,i,t + δ5X5,i,t + δ6X6,i,t + µi,t 
                                                 
16 Equation (9) was also estimated with a time trend and time trend squared variable and the results are reported in 
Appendix E.  The results are very similar. 
17  SUR results are reported in Chapter 4 but the ordinary least squares (OLS) results are virtually identical, 
suggesting that there is little or no correlation among the error terms. 
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where α and δ are parameters to be estimated, µ is the error term and all variables are as defined 
in Table 3.6. 
 The second stage uses the results from the probit model in an OLS estimation procedure 
on the following model 
(20) EVi,t = α + βDi,t + γ1X1,i,t + γ2X2,i,t + γ3X3,i,t + γ4X4,i,t + γ5X5,i,t + γ6X6,i,t+ ςλ + ηi,t 
where Di,t is the binary variable used as the dependent variable in the first stage probit model and 
λ is the self-selection variable.  All Xi,t variables are as previously defined, α, β, γ, and ς are 
parameters to be estimated and η is the error term. 
Notice that Di,t stays in the second stage although it is the dependent variable in the first 
stage.  This is due to the fact that this variable is a “treatment effect”.  Treatment effects must be 
included in situations in which an individual chooses whether or not they receive a treatment (see 
Greene, 2003, pg. 788).  In this case, this refers to a firm choosing whether or not they are 
diversified or integrated sometimes based on the firm effect variables included in equation (20).  
This also means that the entire sample must be used in the second stage and not just those 
observations for which the selection variable (in this case the binary variables that indicate 
diversification or integration) is equal to one (see Greene, 1998, pg. 716) 
 Both the first and second stages of Heckman’s two step procedure described above are 
estimated using each binary variable for each food economy sector separately.  For example, in 
one case, the above model uses the binary variable that indicates vertical integration into 
processing (D1,i,t) for restaurant firms as the dependent variable in the first stage probit model 
and the lambdas calculated from these results in the second stage.  Similarly, the binary variable 
for vertical integration into retail (D3,i,t) for wholesale firms is used as the dependent variable in 
the first stage probit model and the lambdas calculated from these result are used in the second 
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stage.  This is done until each combination of sector and binary variable is used in Heckman’s 
two step procedure. 
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CHAPTER 4 - RESULTS 
The following sections give the results of the analysis described in the previous chapter.  The 
first section discusses the results from the exogenous integration and diversification model, the 
second section discusses the results from the endogenous integration and diversification model, 
and the last section summarizes the results from both models. 
4.1 Exogenous Integration and Diversification Model Results 
Exogeneity assumes that the independent binary variables for diversification and integration are 
not influenced by the other independent variables.  This suggests, for example, that positive 
coefficients on the binary variables in the model would lead to increases in excess value.  The 
coefficients from the estimation of the model with exogenous diversification are shown in Table 
4.1 along with the weighted R2 for the system of equations.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
The weighted R2 values are 0.3889 and 0.4477 for the asset and sales multipliers, respectively.  
These values are greater than those found by other authors.  Campa and Kedia (2002) found R2 
values of 0.09 and 0.13 for their base OLS models using the asset and sales multipliers, 
respectively.  Berger and Ofek (1995) found R2 values of 0.086 and 0.114 for their base OLS 
models using the asset and sales multipliers, respectively.  The higher R2 values in this study are 
higher is likely due to the fact that the data is focused on the food economy rather than a broad 
panel of all firms in the economy. 
Notice in Table 4.1 that every binary variable does not appear in every model.  One 
reason this occurs is because every diversification and integration binary variable does not apply 
to every sector.  For example, a retail firm cannot vertically integrate into retail.  Also, some 
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binary variable categories contain no observations for a particular sector.  For example, no 
wholesale firms are vertically integrated into the restaurant sector in the data. 
4.1.1 Firm Effects 
In every sector except the wholesale sector, the coefficient on log of assets (X1,i,t) is negatively 
and significantly related to excess value and the coefficient on log of assets squared (X5,i,t) is 
positive and significant in all but one case (excluding wholesale).  But, the two coefficients have 
to be considered jointly to determine the total effect of log of assets on the dependent variable.  
For example, a one unit increase in the log of assets increases excess value by 0.0041 percent for 
food processing firms using the asset multiplier. 18  Also, a one unit increase in the log of assets 
increases excess value by 0.3509 percent for retail firms using the sales multiplier.  This 
indicates that asset size has a positive effect on firm value, which is what is expected. 
With the exception of the wholesale sector (asset and sales multiplier), the coefficients on 
the variables for profitability (X2,i,t) and growth (X3,i,t) are positively related to firm value, which 
is what is expected.  For example, for a one unit increase in EBIT over sales (X2,i,t), excess value 
using the sales multiplier increases by 0.0416 percent for restaurant firms.19  A one unit increase 
in capital expenditures over sales (X3,i,t) increases excess value using the asset multiplier by 
0.0185 percent for processing firms.  Capital expenditures over sales includes new assets which 
would presumably increase profitability and lead to an increase in firm value.  An increase in 
                                                 
18 Note that, when taking the derivative, the interpretation is in terms of V/IV and not ln(V/IV).  For example, since 
the mean of the natural log of assets is 19.5124 for firms in the processing sector the total effect of the natural log of 
assets on excess value can be found as follows: 
  ln(V/IV)=γ1ln(Assets) + γ5ln(Assets)2 ∂ ln(V/IV) / ln(Assets) = % Δ (V/IV) / % Δ Assets = γ1 + 2γ5ln(Assets)=-0.0193 + 2*0.0006*19.5124=0.0041. ∂
19 Because the dependent variable is logged, the coefficients must be multiplied by the mean value for interpretation.  
For example, since the mean of EBIT over sales for firms in the restaurant sector is 1.0700 the effect of EBIT over 
sales on excess value can be found as follows: 
ln(V/IV)=γ2(EBIT/sales) ∂ ln(V/IV)/(∂ (EBIT/sales)/(EBIT/sales))=γ2 * (EBIT/sales) = 0.0388 * 1.0700 = 0.0416. 
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EBIT over sales is indicative of an increase in profitability which would lead to an increase in 
firm value.  Campa and Kedia (2002) and Berger and Ofek (1995) also found positive and 
significant coefficients for EBIT over sales and capital expenditures over sales. 
The coefficient on debt to asset ratio (X4,i,t) is positive and significant in the restaurant 
sector and in the wholesale sector when the asset multiplier is used.  The coefficient on debt to 
asset ratio (X4,i,t) is negative and significant in the retail sector.  For example, a one unit increase 
in the debt to asset ratio increases excess value using the sales multiplier by 0.0427 percent for 
restaurant firms and decreases excess value using the asset multiplier by 0.0411 percent for retail 
firms.  Leverage is usually thought to have a negative effect on firm value but large restaurant 
chains that carry a large amount of debt due to the specialized buildings and equipment that are 
needed may not be valued lower because they are highly leveraged. 
Notice that X6,i,t, the variable for family control, is positive and significant in every 
equation which supports the finding by Anderson and Reeb (2003) that family control increases 
firm value.  As discussed by Halvorsen and Palmquist (1980) and Kennedy (1981) adjustment is 
necessary when interpreting dummy variables in equations with logged dependent variables.  
The third values for X6,i,t in Table 4.1 show the adjusted coefficients for X6,i,t for each sector and 
multiplier.  The following formula from Kennedy (1981) is used for the adjustment 
(21)    1)ˆ(ˆ
2
1ˆexp* −⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −= cVcg  
where ĉ is the estimated coefficient, is the variance of ĉ and g* is the adjusted value. )ˆ(ˆ cV
Table 4.1 indicates that a firm being family-controlled increases excess value using the 
asset multiplier by 23.69 percent for processing firms.  And, a firm being family-controlled 
increases excess value using the sales multiplier by 10.76 percent for retail firms. 
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4.1.2 Integration and Diversification Effects  
 Because the dummy variable for single segment firms is used as the default variable in 
the SUR estimation, all of the interpretations are in relation to this variable.  Therefore, in Table 
4.2, the regression coefficients are used to find a discount or premium using the mean value for 
single segment firms in each of the sectors and for each of the multipliers.  The shaded discounts 
and premiums are calculated from regression coefficients that are significant at the 10 percent 
level.  The regression coefficients are the increases or decreases in excess value relative to the 
mean excess value for single segment firms.  So, to find the actual discount or premium, the 
regression coefficient is multiplied by the mean for single segment firms and this value is added 
to the mean.  For example, for processing firms, the 0.06 percent discount for vertical integration 
into wholesale (D2,i,t) using the sales multiplier is calculated as follows:  0.0158 + (0.0158*(-
0.9645)) = 0.00056*100 = 0.06 percent where 0.0158 is the mean excess value for single 
segment processing firms using the sales multiplier and -0.9645 is the regression coefficient on 
(D2,i,t) from Table 4.1.  In the model using the asset multiplier, vertical integration into the 
wholesale sector (D2,i,t) results in a 0.73 percent premium for processing firms (Table 4.2).  This 
indicates that processing firms that are integrated into the wholesale sector are valued higher than 
single segment processing firms, holding all other variables constant.  The same is true for every 
binary variable in every case in the processing sector where the largest premium is for unrelated 
diversification (D5,i,t) using both multipliers and the smallest premiums are for unrelated 
diversification and horizontal integration pursued jointly (D7,i,t). 
The results indicate that discounts are associated with every diversification and 
integration strategy in the wholesale sector using both the asset and sales multipliers except for 
vertical integration into processing (D5,i,t) which results in a premium using both multipliers and 
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vertical integration into retail (D3,i,t) using the sales multiplier which also results in a premium.  
The largest discounts in the wholesale sector are for unrelated diversification (D5,i,t).  In the retail 
sector, in the model using the asset multiplier, horizontal integration (D6,i,t) results in a 3.08 
percent premium.  This indicates that retail firms that are horizontally integrated are valued 
higher than single segment retail firms, holding all other variables constant. In the restaurant 
sector, in the model using the sales multiplier, vertical integration into the processing sector 
(D1,i,t) results in a 1.56 percent premium.  This indicates that restaurant firms that are integrated 
into the processing sector are valued higher than single segment restaurant firms, holding all 
other variables constant.  The largest premiums in the restaurant sector are for unrelated 
diversification (D5,i,t). 
Overall, the results from the models with exogenous integration and diversification 
variables indicate that, in most cases, diversified and integrated firms are valued at a premium 
relative to single segment firms, with variation between sectors and multipliers used.  The 
hypothesis tests are done at the 10 percent level of significance by testing the significance of the 
parameter estimate for that variable.  Thus, the hypothesis that integration leads to a premium for 
food economy firms cannot be rejected for the restaurant sector and for the processing sector 
except in the case of vertical integration into retail (D3,i,t) in the processing sector.  The 
hypothesis that integration leads to a premium for food economy firms also cannot be rejected in 
the wholesale sector for vertical integration into processing (D1,i,t) using both multipliers and 
vertical integration into retail (D3,i,t) using the sales multiplier.  The hypothesis that integration 
leads to a premium for food economy firms also cannot be rejected in the retail sector for vertical 
integration into processing using the asset multiplier (D1,i,t), vertical integration into wholesale 
using the sales multiplier (D2,i,t), and horizontal integration using the asset multiplier (D6,i,t).  The 
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hypothesis that diversification leads to a discount for food economy firms is not rejected for the 
wholesale sector using the asset multiplier and for the retail sector using the sales multiplier 
because a discount is found for unrelated diversification (D5,i,t) in these cases. 
To further investigate the hypotheses, it is important to determine if diversification and 
integration decisions should be considered endogenous instead of exogenous.  In other words, 
the diversification and integration decisions may not be independent of the firm effects.  
Therefore, the results of the endogeneity tests are discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 4.1  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results for Food Economy Firms by Sector and Multiplier 
 Processing Wholesale Retail Restaurant 
 Asset 
multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Intercept 0.0022 
(0.0086) 
0.0017 
(0.0095) 
0.0002 
(0.0028) 
0.0001 
(0.0037) 
0.0000 
(0.0025) 
0.0000 
(0.0030) 
0.0008 
(0.0067) 
0.0006 
(0.0074) 
X1,i,t -0.0193*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0532*** 
(0.0048) 
0.0101 
(0.0063) 
0.0137* 
(0.0081) 
-0.0675*** 
(0.0045) 
-0.0960*** 
(0.0053) 
-0.0054 
(0.0055) 
-0.1237*** 
(0.0060) 
X2,i,t 1.4859*** 
(0.1041) 
1.6122*** 
(0.1151) 
-1.2972*** 
(0.1230) 
-0.7750*** 
(0.1585) 
12.2051*** 
(0.3383) 
15.5805*** 
(0.3998) 
1.9621*** 
(0.1150) 
1.0700*** 
(0.1265) 
X3,i,t 0.3048** 
(0.1233) 
2.0369*** 
(0.1364) 
0.0457 
(0.1301) 
3.0647*** 
(0.1677) 
-0.2016 
(0.2218) 
4.5686*** 
(0.2620) 
1.5702*** 
(0.0826) 
2.8617*** 
(0.0909) 
X4,i,t -0.0287 
(0.0450) 
0.0070 
(0.0498) 
0.5016*** 
(0.0559) 
-0.0588 
(0.0721) 
-0.1342*** 
(0.0347) 
-0.1514*** 
(0.0410) 
0.2002*** 
(0.0238) 
0.1338*** 
(0.0262) 
X5,i,t 0.0006*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0020*** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0011*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0016*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0027*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0032*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0005* 
(0.0003) 
0.0057*** 
(0.0003) 
X6,i,ta 0.2234*** 
(0.0215) 
23.69 
0.1390*** 
(0.0238) 
13.55 
0.2140*** 
(0.0746) 
19.33 
0.2248** 
(0.0962) 
19.33 
0.1945*** 
(0.0183) 
20.36 
0.1131*** 
(0.0216) 
10.76 
0.2590*** 
(0.0512 
26.29) 
0.1980*** 
(0.0563) 
18.52 
D1,i,t 
n/ab n/a 
-1.0584*** 
(0.0400) 
-1.3672*** 
(0.0516) 
-0.7319*** 
(0.0419) 
-0.9027*** 
(0.0496) 
-0.5825*** 
(0.0559) 
-0.5907*** 
(0.0615) 
D2,i,t -0.8303*** 
(0.0768) 
-0.9645*** 
(0.0850) n/a n/a 
-1.1601*** 
(0.0324) 
-1.2258*** 
(0.0383) 
-0.9353*** 
(0.0801) 
-0.7907*** 
(0.0882) 
D3,i,t -0.2094 
(0.1770) 
-0.0823 
(0.1958) 
-0.9171*** 
(0.0317) 
-1.1156*** 
(0.0408) n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D4,i,t -0.7567*** 
(0.0536) 
-0.7227*** 
(0.0594) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D5,i,t -0.0684 
(0.0429) 
-0.0642 
(0.0475) 
-0.3246*** 
(0.0510) 
-0.0671 
(0.0657) 
-0.5291*** 
(0.0289) 
-0.5057*** 
(0.0341) 
-0.5798*** 
(0.0603) 
-0.4655*** 
(0.0664) 
D6,i,t -0.8053*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.7474*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.3640*** 
(0.0584) 
-0.7555*** 
(0.0752) 
-0.6123*** 
(0.1524) 
-0.5182*** 
(0.1801) n/a n/a 
D7,i,t -0.9893*** 
(0.0574) 
-0.9422*** 
(0.0635) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D9,i,t -0.4529*** 
(0.0820) 
-0.7538*** 
(0.0907) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
System 
Weighted R2 0.3889 0.4477       
aThe third values in this row are the adjusted parameter estimates found using equation (21). 
bn/a denotes not applicable, ***significant at the 1% level, **significant at the 5% level, *significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.2  Calculated Premiums and Discounts from Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results 
 Processing Wholesale Retail Restaurant 
 Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Single 
Segment 
Mean 
 
4.29% 
 
1.58% -0.95% -20.18% 7.95% -6.40% 5.78% 3.81% 
D1,i,t n/aa n/a 0.06%b 7.41% 2.13% -0.62% 2.41% 1.56% 
D2,i,t 0.73%c 0.06% n/a n/a -1.27% 1.45% 0.37% 0.80% 
D3,i,t 3.39% 1.45% -0.08% 2.33% n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D4,i,t 1.04% 0.44% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D5,i,t 4.00% 1.48% -0.64% -18.83% 3.74% -3.16% 2.43% 2.04% 
D6,i,t 0.84% 0.40% -0.60% -4.93% 3.08% -3.08% n/a n/a 
D7,i,t 0.05% 0.09% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D9,i,t 2.35% 0.39% n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
bThe regression coefficients from Table 4.1 are multiplied by the mean for single segment firms and this value is added to the mean to 
find the actual discount or premium in every case.  For example, for processing firms, the 3.1 percent discount for vertical integration 
into wholesale (D2,i,t) using the sales multiplier is calculated as follows:  0.0158+(0.0158*-0.9645) = 0.00056*100 = 0.06% where 
0.0158 is the mean excess value for single segment processing firms using the sales multiplier and -0.9645 is the regression coefficient 
on (D2,i,t) from Table 4.1. 
cShaded cells indicate that the discount or premium is calculated from a regression coefficient that is significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
4.2 Endogenous Integration and Diversification Model Results 
Recall that Heckman’s two step procedure was used to test the endogeneity of the diversification 
or integration decision.  Tables 4.3 to 4.8 provide the results of the second stage of this procedure 
for each food economy sector along with the adjusted R2 for each model.  The probit results from 
the first stage are reported in Appendix F since their purpose is to calculate lambda and not to 
show a causal relationship.  Recall that both the first and second stage of Heckman’s two step 
procedure is performed for each binary variable and then the binary variable that is the 
dependent variable in the first stage is also included as a “treatment effect” in the second stage, 
along with the self-selection parameter, λ.  The rows in Tables 4.3 to 4.8 that are labeled Di,t 
provide the coefficient and standard error for the binary variable that is left in the model.  Each 
column heading indicates the specific binary variable in the model.  If the coefficient on lambda 
is significant, it indicates that diversification or integration decision is endogenous and the sign 
indicates whether the relationship between firm value and the factors that influence 
diversification and integration is positive or negative. 
Table 4.9 summarizes the endogeneity tests from each of the models.  If a cell contains 
n/a, the variable did not occur in that particular model.  If the cell is empty, lambda is not 
significantly different from zero in that model.  And, the cells with positive and negative signs 
indicate the signs of the significant lambdas. 
Each subsection below provides the results from a specific sector of the food economy.  
Then, Section 4.3 compares and summarizes the results from the previous section where 
integration and diversification are exogenous and the current section on endogeneity. 
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4.2.1 Processing Sector 
As a general rule, the signs and significance of the firm effect (Xi,t) variables do not change much 
with each binary variable used for processing sector firms as compared to the results from SUR, 
although the magnitudes do change in some cases.  The magnitudes of the coefficients are 
similar across each equation with the each of the binary variables. 
Four of the eight lambda coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level in the models 
using the asset multiplier (Table 4.3) and four are significant using the sales multiplier (Table 
4.4).  The coefficients on lambda in the models that include the binary variable for vertical 
integration into wholesale (D2,i,t) using both the asset and sales multiplier are positive and 
significant (e.g., 1.3482 and 1.3149 for the asset and sales multipliers, respectively) indicating 
that the characteristics that make firms choose to vertically integrate into wholesale are 
positively correlated with firm value.  The coefficients on lambda in the models with the asset 
multiplier and unrelated diversification (D5,i,t), unrelated diversification with horizontal 
integration (D7,i,t) and vertical integration into production (D9,i,t) are negative and significant.  
The coefficients on lambda in the models with the sales multiplier and vertical integration into 
restaurants (D4,i,t), unrelated diversification (D5,i,t) and single segment firms (D8,i,t) are negative 
and significant. 
Recall that, using SUR, there was a premium for every diversification and integration 
strategy in the processing sector.  But, in Table 4.3, the premium20 for vertical integration into 
wholesale (D2,i,t) turns negative in the models using the asset multiplier.  For example, in Table 
4.2 there is a premium for vertical integration into wholesale (D2,i,t) using the asset multiplier, but 
in Table 4.3 the coefficient for vertical integration into wholesale (D2,i,t) is negative.  The 
                                                 
20 Recall that this premium can be found in the row labeled Di,t. 
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premium turns negative for vertical integration into wholesale (D2,i,t) when the sales multiplier is 
used as well (Table 4.4). 
4.2.2 Wholesale Sector 
In the wholesale sector, two of the five lambda coefficients are significant in the model using the 
sales multiplier (Table 4.5) and three of the five lambda coefficients are significant in the model 
using the asset multiplier (Table 4.6).  The coefficients on lambda in the models that include the 
binary variable for horizontal integration (D6,i,t) using both the asset and sales multiplier are 
negative and significant indicating that the characteristics that make firms choose to horizontally 
integrate are negatively correlated with firm value. 
The coefficient on lambda in the model that includes the binary variable for vertical 
integration into processing (D1,i,t) using the sales multiplier is positive and significant indicating 
that the characteristics that make wholesale firms choose to vertically integrate into processing 
are positively correlated with firm value.  The lambda coefficient in the model that includes the 
binary variable for vertical integration into retail (D3,i,t) using the asset multiplier is positive and 
significant indicating that the characteristics that make wholesale firms choose to vertically 
integrate into retail are positively correlated with firm value.  The coefficient on lambda in the 
model that includes the binary variable for single segment firms (D8,i,t) using the sales multiplier 
is negative and significant indicating that the characteristics that make wholesale firms choose to 
be single segment firms are negatively correlated with firm value. 
The magnitudes, signs, and significance of the firm effect (Xi,t) variables change with all 
binary variable used for wholesale sector firms as compared to the results from SUR.  But notice 
that these results are also not consistent across the models that include different binary variables.  
The discount for horizontal integration (D6,i,t) found using SUR turns positive in the model using 
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the asset and sales multiplier.  For example, in Table 4.2 there is a discount for horizontal 
integration (D6,i,t) using the sales multiplier for wholesale firms but in Table 4.6 the coefficient 
for horizontal integration (D6,i,t) is positive. 
4.2.3 Retail Sector 
The coefficient on lambda in the models that include the binary variable for unrelated 
diversification (D5,i,t) using both the asset and sales multiplier is negative and significant 
indicating that the characteristics that make firms choose to pursue unrelated diversification are 
negatively correlated with firm value (Table 4.7).  The magnitudes, signs, and significance of the 
firm effect (Xi,t) variables change slightly with each binary variable used for retail sector firms as 
compared to the results from SUR. 
4.2.4 Restaurant Sector 
Six of the eight parameter estimates for lambda are significant at the ten percent level for the 
models using the sales and asset multipliers.  The coefficients on lambda in the models that 
include the binary variable for vertical integration into wholesale (D2,i,t) using both the asset and 
sales multipliers are positive and significant indicating that the characteristics that make 
restaurant firms choose to vertically integrate into wholesale are positively correlated with firm 
value.  The coefficients on the firm effect (Xi,t) variables change slightly with each binary 
variable used for restaurant sector firms as compared to the results from SUR (Table 4.8). 
The coefficients on lambda in the models that include the binary variable for vertical 
integration into processing (D1,i,t) using both the asset and sales multipliers are negative and 
significant indicating that the characteristics that make restaurant firms choose to vertically 
integrate into processing are negatively correlated with firm value.  Also, the parameter estimates 
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on lambda in the models that include the binary variable for unrelated diversification (D5,i,t) 
using both the asset and sales multipliers are positive and significant indicating that the 
characteristics that make restaurant firms choose to pursue unrelated diversification are 
positively correlated with firm value. 
In Table 4.8, the premiums for vertical integration into wholesale (D2,i,t) and unrelated 
diversification (D5,i,t) turn negative in the models using the asset and sales multipliers whereas in 
Table 4.2 these values were positive. 
4.3 Summary of Results 
Sorting through the results of the endogeneity tests is somewhat tedious, so the following 
sections summarize the results.  The first subsection summarizes the results from the exogenous 
model, the second section summarizes the results from the endogenous model, and the last 
section provides some overall results. 
4.3.1 Summary of Exogenous Model Results 
The SUR results indicate that there is a premium for every diversification and integration 
strategy relative to single segment firms in the processing and restaurant sectors, except in the 
case of vertical integration into retail in the processing sector using both multipliers because 
these regression coefficients are insignificant.  In the retail sector there is a premium in every 
case except vertical integration into wholesale using the asset multiplier and a discount in every 
case except vertical integration into wholesale using the sales multiplier.  There is a discount in 
every case in the wholesale sector except for vertical integration into processing using both 
multipliers and vertical integration into retail using the sales multiplier.  The SUR results also 
indicate that the ratio of capital expenditures to sales and the ratio of EBIT to sales positively 
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influence excess value.  A firm being family controlled has a positive impact on firm value as 
well. 
4.3.2 Summary of Endogenous Model Results 
If lambda is significant in the second stage of Heckman’s two step procedure, this indicates that 
the specific diversification or integration strategy that is in the model is endogenous.  This means 
that it is correlated with the firm characteristics that influence excess value.  If lambda is 
negative (positive) this correlation is negative (positive) and coefficients on the binary variables 
in the SUR results are biased downward (upward).  The strongest endogeneity indications are 
given by those cases in which the signs using the assets and sales multipliers are the same and 
the lambdas are both significant.  These are the darker shaded cells in Table 4.9.  The same can 
be said for the cases in which the lambdas for both the asset and sales multiplier are insignificant, 
indicating the binary diversification or integration decision is exogenously determined.  These 
are the lighter shaded cells in Table 4.9. 
4.3.2.1 Cases of Exogeneity 
If the diversification or integration strategy is exogenous it suggests that the firm characteristics 
that influence excess value are not correlated with lambda.  This indicates that the integration or 
diversification strategy is random in the sample.  The results indicate that the integration or 
diversification decision is exogenous in the case of processing firms that vertically integrate into 
the retail sector (D3,i,t), processing firms that horizontally integrate (D6,i,t), wholesale firms that 
pursue unrelated diversification (D5,i,t), and retail firms that vertically integrate into the 
processing (D1,i,t) and wholesale sectors (D2,i,t). 
In the case where lambda is not significant using both multipliers, it can be assumed that 
the sign on the binary variables in the SUR results is correct.  And, since all of the signs are 
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positive on the binary variables in the SUR results in the processing and restaurant sectors and in 
the retail sector using the asset multiplier (except in the case of vertical integration into 
wholesale), the premiums remain when the diversification or integration decision is found to be 
exogenous in these cases. 
4.3.2.2 Cases of Endogeneity 
Recall that a significant lambda indicates endogeneity.  When lambda is negative and significant, 
this means that when the firm characteristics that cause firms to diversify or integrate are 
negatively correlated with firm value, the discount turns to a premium.  This may seem 
counterintuitive at first but recall that the data set includes firms that are diversifying or 
integrating and those that are not.  When you control for firms that are choosing to diversify or 
integrate based on exogenous characteristics (that are negatively correlated with firm value), the 
effect of diversification or integration on firm value is actually positive for these firms.  The 
results from Campa and Kedia (2002) also indicate a premium that was previously a discount 
and a negative lambda coefficient for diversification.  When lambda is positive and significant, 
this means that when the firm characteristics that cause firms to diversify or integrate are 
positively correlated with firm value, the premium turns to a discount.   
There is one case where, using both multipliers, the lambdas are negative and significant 
and the discounts from the SUR results become premiums.  This is the case of wholesale firms 
that are pursuing horizontal integration.  The results suggest that this type of horizontal 
integration strategy leads to a premium, on average.  Thus, the hypothesis that a premium exists 
for food economy firms pursing integration cannot be rejected in the case of wholesale firms that 
are horizontally integrated. 
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Table 4.9 shows three cases in which characteristics that cause firms to diversify or 
integrate are positively correlated with firm value and the premiums from the SUR results turn to 
discounts using both multipliers.  One of these cases is vertical integration into wholesale by 
processing firms.  The results suggest that, on average, this decision may lead to a discount in 
this situation for this time period.  Vertical integration into wholesale by restaurant firms is 
another case where lambda is positive.  Ruby Tuesday is a restaurant firm that was vertically 
integrated into grocery wholesaling in the 1980s but divested itself of its wholesaling operations 
by the end of the 1990s.  This indicates that management may have realized this type of activity 
was having a negative effect on firm value.  Another case is unrelated diversification by 
restaurant firms.  The results suggest that this type of activity is causing a discount during this 
time period, on average. 
In all of these cases, the premiums turn to discounts that are statistically significant.  This 
indicates that, when controlling for firms that are choosing to diversify or integrate based on 
exogenous characteristics (that are positively correlated with excess value), the effect of 
diversification or integration on firm value is actually negative. 
 
Table 4.3  Results from the Second Stage of Heckman's Two-Step Procedure for Processing Firms Using the Asset Multiplier 
D D2,i,t D3,i,t D4,i,t D5,i,t D6,i,t D7,i,t 8,i,t D9,i,t 
Intercept 6.4537*** 
(1.0493) 
6.7717*** 
(1.1479) 
6.6088*** 
(0.9369) 
7.6861*** 
(1.7076) 
7.1519*** 
(0.9077) 
6.5636*** 
(1.0278) 
7.0277*** 
(0.7873) 
6.4044*** 
(0.8552) 
Di,t -4.0587** 
(1.7939) 
9.5184 
(6.8564) 
-0.0163 
(0.9758) 
4.0533*** 
(1.0475) 
-0.4295 
(0.3553) 
1.7794** 
(0.7306) 
0.9849** 
(0.3976) 
0.8826*** 
(0.6661) 
X1,i,t -0.6579*** 
(0.1085) 
-0.6842*** 
(0.1185) 
-0.6730*** 
(0.0971) 
-0.7660*** 
(0.1774) 
-0.7385*** 
(0.0978) 
-0.6610*** 
(0.1064) 
-0.8499*** 
(0.1068) 
-0.6487*** 
(0.0886) 
X2,i,t 1.8079*** 
(0.2281) 
1.9373*** 
(0.2290) 
2.0045*** 
(0.1854) 
1.9290*** 
(0.3429) 
1.9794*** 
(0.1616) 
2.1176*** 
(0.2129) 
1.7832*** 
(0.1806) 
2.0616*** 
(0.1768) 
X3,i,t 0.3304 
(0.2436) 
0.5291** 
(0.2609) 
0.5085** 
(0.2052) 
0.8505** 
(0.3850) 
0.4332** 
(0.1974) 
0.4744* 
(0.2497) 
0.2832 
(0.2047) 
0.5376*** 
(0.2025) 
X4,i,t -0.0061 
(0.0933) 
-0.0117 
(0.1029) 
-0.0021 
(0.0780) 
-0.0146 
(0.1507) 
-0.0103 
(0.0690) 
0.0642 
(0.0919) 
-0.0845 
(0.0750) 
-0.0095 
(0.0739) 
X5,i,t 0.0157*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0160*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0159*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0172*** 
(0.0045) 
0.0180*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0152*** 
(0.0027) 
0.0220*** 
(0.0032) 
0.0152*** 
(0.0023) 
X6,i,t 0.3676*** 
(0.0457) 
0.3741*** 
(0.0486) 
0.3519*** 
(0.0417) 
0.3107*** 
(0.0753) 
0.3226*** 
(0.0409) 
0.3819*** 
(0.0439) 
0.2555*** 
(0.0505) 
0.3455*** 
(0.0354) 
λ 1.3482* 
(0.7034) 
-3.2936 
(2.3413) 
-0.2592 
(0.4249) 
-1.9243*** 
(0.5024) 
-0.1560 
(0.1886) 
-1.1177*** 
(0.3134) 
-0.1853 
(0.2302) 
-0.4740* 
(0.2730) 
Adj. R2 0.1425 0.1359 0.1511 0.1410 0.2321 0.1660 0.2843 0.1309 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.4  Results from the Second Stage of Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Processing Firms Using the Sales Multiplier 
D D2,i,t D3,i,t D4,i,t D5,i,t D6,i,t D7,i,t 8,i,t D9,i,t 
Intercept 4.6076*** 
(1.0917) 
4.9094*** 
(1.1388) 
4.1097*** 
(1.0691) 
5.5405*** 
(1.3974) 
5.6974*** 
(1.0035) 
4.7523*** 
(0.9106) 
5.5858*** 
(1.0829) 
4.7059*** 
(0.9215) 
Di,t -4.1157** 
(1.7891) 
8.4898 
(6.0557) 
1.4343* 
(0.7502) 
2.9262*** 
(0.8223) 
-0.7333* 
(0.3981) 
0.2409 
(0.7924) 
1.9140*** 
(0.4229) 
0.2310 
(0.7947) 
X1,i,t -0.5026*** 
(0.1128) 
-0.5278*** 
(0.1176) 
-0.4488*** 
(0.1104) 
-0.5848*** 
(0.1446) 
-0.6304*** 
(0.1082) 
-0.5156*** 
(0.0940) 
-0.8624*** 
(0.1339) 
-0.5109*** 
(0.0956) 
X2,i,t 1.8825*** 
(0.2364) 
2.0220*** 
(0.2285) 
2.1966*** 
(0.2154) 
2.0277*** 
(0.2812) 
2.0381*** 
(0.1779) 
2.0983*** 
(0.1922) 
1.6506*** 
(0.2377) 
2.0977*** 
(0.1911) 
X3,i,t 2.0522*** 
(0.2562) 
2.2510*** 
(0.2619) 
2.1499*** 
(0.2491) 
2.4794*** 
(0.3227) 
2.1050*** 
(0.2176) 
2.2274*** 
(0.2180) 
1.7959*** 
(0.2726) 
2.2397*** 
(0.2177) 
X4,i,t 0.0339 
(0.0967) 
0.0294 
(0.1015) 
0.0817 
(0.0912) 
0.0290 
(0.1225) 
0.0236 
(0.0760) 
0.0473 
(0.0848) 
-0.1227 
(0.0999) 
0.0363 
(0.0794) 
X5,i,t 0.0124*** 
(0.0029) 
0.0126*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0106*** 
(0.0028) 
0.0135*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0161*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0125*** 
(0.0024) 
0.0245*** 
(0.0038) 
0.0124*** 
(0.0025) 
X6,i,t 0.2643*** 
(0.0472) 
0.2682*** 
(0.0481) 
0.2835*** 
(0.0453) 
0.2187*** 
(0.0604) 
0.1981*** 
(0.0453) 
0.2528*** 
(0.0401) 
0.0607 
(0.0608) 
0.2470*** 
(0.0381) 
λ 1.3149* 
(0.7016) 
-2.8952 
(2.0680) 
-0.8765*** 
(0.3249) 
-1.4151*** 
(0.3940) 
0.0448 
(0.2114) 
-0.4295 
(0.3420) 
-0.7363*** 
(0.2441) 
-0.3280 
(0.3272) 
Adj. R2 0.1511 0.1393 0.1523 0.1398 0.2047 0.1597 0.2604 0.1413 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.5  Results from the Second Stage of Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Wholesale Firms Using the Asset Multiplier 
 D1,i,t D3,i,t D5,i,t D6,i,t D8,i,t 
Intercept 14.6492*** 
(4.1683) 
13.9302*** 
(4.0419) 
14.3842*** 
(3.5327) 
10.4672* 
(6.0597) 
-6.1692 
(10.0042) 
Di,t -0.1850 
(0.8450) 
-2.2407*** 
(0.6980) 
-0.1978 
(0.6353) 
4.9541** 
(2.0191) 
3.3273** 
(1.3007) 
X1,i,t -1.5205*** 
(0.4534) 
-1.5897*** 
(0.4397) 
-1.4875*** 
(0.3894) 
-1.0025 
(0.6691) 
0.1924 
(0.9307) 
X2,i,t 0.0593 
(0.5979) 
-0.5613 
(0.7705) 
-0.0496 
(0.6891) 
0.0074 
(0.9838) 
-2.7989* 
(1.5752) 
X3,i,t 0.5032 
(0.5725) 
0.1260 
(0.7085) 
0.6239 
(0.6781) 
0.5416 
(0.9130) 
1.2788 
(1.0856) 
X4,i,t 0.3084 
(0.2551) 
0.6624** 
(0.3252) 
0.2917 
(0.2485) 
0.7270* 
(0.4134) 
0.7513 
(0.5037) 
X5,i,t 0.0374*** 
(0.0120) 
0.0443*** 
(0.0120) 
0.0364*** 
(0.0105) 
0.0210 
(0.0183) 
0.0002** 
(0.0228) 
X6,i,t 0.3744 
(0.4369) n/aa n/a n/a 
0.0787 
(0.6486) 
λ -0.2453 
(0.4677) 
1.0124** 
(0.4238) 
0.1923 
(0.3613) 
-2.7207*** 
(1.0294) 
-1.6316 
(0.7883) 
Adj. R2 0.2440 0.3067 0.2035 0.3124 0.3579 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.6  Results from the Second Stage of Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Wholesale Firms Using the Sales Multiplier 
 D1,i,t D3,i,t D5,i,t D6,i,t D8,i,t 
Intercept -0.2924 
(6.4011) 
8.6411* 
(4.5425) 
12.4847*** 
(4.7496) 
5.0675 
(6.8406) 
-17.6041 
(12.8115) 
Di,t -3.1693** 
(1.2860) 
-1.9649** 
(0.7986) 
1.3857* 
(0.8431) 
4.9551** 
(2.1809) 
4.2425** 
(1.6615) 
X1,i,t 0.1299 
(0.6966) 
-0.9724** 
(0.4927) 
-1.2903** 
(0.5234) 
-0.3914 
(0.7540) 
1.3084 
(1.1916) 
X2,i,t -0.1190 
(0.9286) 
-0.4812 
(0.8761) 
0.7687 
(0.9256) 
0.0121 
(1.1383) 
-3.5900* 
(2.0137) 
X3,i,t 3.1348*** 
(0.8863) 
3.2597*** 
(0.8063) 
2.7892*** 
(0.9098) 
3.6281*** 
(1.0586) 
4.5631*** 
(1.3879) 
X4,i,t -0.0116 
(0.3993) 
0.0159 
(0.3686) 
-0.2423 
(0.3348) 
0.1251 
(0.4791) 
0.2793 
(0.6425) 
X5,i,t -0.0073 
(0.0185) 
0.0260* 
(0.0134) 
0.0306** 
(0.0142) 
0.0035 
(0.0205) 
-0.0285 
(0.0292) 
X6,i,t 1.3062* 
(0.6905) n/aa n/a n/a 
-0.0978 
(0.8256) 
λ 1.2797* 
(0.7015) 
0.7761 
(0.4894) 
-0.6648 
(0.4723) 
-2.8537** 
(1.1150) 
-2.0687** 
(1.0067) 
Adj. R2 0.2902 0.2968 0.2391 0.2973 0.3729 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.7  Results from the Second Stage of Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Retail Firms 
 Asset Multiplier Sales Multiplier 
 D1,i,t D2,i,t D5,i,t D8,i,t D1,i,t D2,i,t D5,i,t D8,i,t 
Intercept -2.8666 
(3.3528) 
1.5957 
(2.9843) 
1.7638 
(7.0577) 
-1.0360 
(3.8522) 
-0.1120 
(3.7808) 
2.5710 
(3.4451) 
3.5369 
(6.5735) 
6.6250 
(7.9804) 
Di,t -1.3510* 
(0.7451) 
-1.5175*** 
(0.5605) 
2.9888* 
(1.7750) 
0.0947 
(0.7684) 
-0.6727 
(0.8896) 
-1.0547 
(0.6712) 
2.6256 
(1.6283) 
-1.8434 
(1.3884) 
X1,i,t 0.2480 
(0.3308) 
-0.2373 
(0.2972) 
-0.2075 
(0.6934) 
0.0479 
(0.3300) 
-0.0548 
(0.3733) 
-0.3492 
(0.3435) 
-0.4106 
(0.6454) 
-0.5026 
(0.7278) 
X2,i,t 14.0131*** 
(1.3580) 
11.6091*** 
(1.1708) 
14.9531*** 
(2.7696) 
12.7626*** 
(1.2557) 
16.7468*** 
(1.5431) 
15.3103*** 
(1.3551) 
18.0476*** 
(2.5942) 
17.3632*** 
(2.8864) 
X3,i,t -0.2097 
(0.7888) 
-0.2165 
(0.7162) 
-0.4527 
(1.8188) 
-0.1048 
(0.7654) 
4.6682*** 
(0.8824) 
4.6407*** 
(0.8240) 
4.4295*** 
(1.6752) 
4.9364*** 
(1.7961) 
X4,i,t -0.0629 
(0.1495) 
-0.1089 
(0.1171) 
0.1857 
(0.3141) 
-0.2214* 
(0.1190) 
-0.1906 
(0.1712) 
-0.1906 
(0.1355) 
0.0968 
(0.2998) 
-0.3346 
(0.2881) 
X5,i,t -0.0062 
(0.0081) 
0.0071 
(0.0074) 
0.0043(0.01
68) 
-0.0009 
(0.0078) 
0.0012 
(0.0092) 
0.0092 
(0.0085) 
0.0091 
(0.0156) 
0.0106 
(0.0175) 
X6,i,t 0.1927*** 
(0.0646) 
0.2556*** 
(0.0641) n/aa 
0.1809** 
(0.0714) 
0.1052 
(0.0722) 
0.1504** 
(0.0743) n/a 
0.1852 
(0.1602) 
λ 0.3248 
(0.3419) 
0.2113 
(0.2801) 
-1.7112** 
(0.8671) 
0.3834 
(0.4225) 
-0.0703 
(0.4103) 
-0.0577 
(0.3360) 
-1.5071* 
(0.7951) 
1.4777* 
(0.7635) 
Adj. R2 0.2934 0.4081 0.3026 0.4603 0.3599 0.4400 0.3542 0.4877 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.8  Results from the Second Stage of Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Restaurant Firms 
 Asset Multiplier Sales Multiplier 
 D1,i,t D2,i,t D5,i,t D8,i,t D1,i,t D2,i,t D5,i,t D8,i,t 
Intercept 9.0930*** 
(1.4835) 
5.4937*** 
(1.2539) 
7.0939*** 
(1.3443) 
5.5935*** 
(1.2369) 
6.1292*** 
(1.3431) 
3.4046** 
(1.3479) 
4.9411*** 
(1.2333) 
2.4458* 
(1.3925) 
Di,t 2.6197*** 
(0.8964) 
-3.6719*** 
(1.4065) 
-3.3803*** 
(0.9930) 
0.6727* 
(0.3557) 
1.5530** 
(0.7029) 
-3.5381** 
(1.4634) 
-2.4120*** 
(0.8359) 
1.1353*** 
(0.3950) 
X1,i,t -0.9864*** 
(0.1610) 
-0.6018*** 
(0.1358) 
-0.7676*** 
(0.1463) 
-0.6832*** 
(0.1141) 
-0.7853*** 
(0.1455) 
-0.4938*** 
(0.1460) 
-0.6543*** 
(0.1340) 
-0.5116*** 
(0.1291) 
X2,i,t 2.2580*** 
(0.2835) 
2.0341*** 
(0.2488) 
2.3518*** 
(0.2645) 
2.2444*** 
(0.1975) 
1.2770*** 
(0.2557) 
1.0556*** 
(0.2667) 
1.3409*** 
(0.2494) 
1.2453*** 
(0.2242) 
X3,i,t 1.9994*** 
(0.2051) 
1.5910*** 
(0.1770) 
1.4622*** 
(0.1966) 
1.6400*** 
(0.1620) 
3.1646*** 
(0.1862) 
2.8474*** 
(0.1904) 
2.8067*** 
(0.1895) 
2.7795*** 
(0.1828) 
X4,i,t 0.1287** 
(0.0601) 
0.1639*** 
(0.0491) 
0.1144** 
(0.0541) 
0.1576*** 
(0.0405) 
0.0862* 
(0.053) 
0.1101** 
(0.0526) 
0.0732 
(0.0516) 
0.1025** 
(0.0460) 
X5,i,t 0.0252*** 
(0.0043) 
0.0155*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0199*** 
(0.0040) 
0.0176*** 
(0.0030) 
0.0230*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0157*** 
(0.0039) 
0.0199*** 
(0.0036) 
0.0162 
(0.0034) 
X6,i,t 
n/aa 
0.3021*** 
(0.1116) n/a 
0.2395*** 
(0.0902) n/a 
0.2414** 
(0.1178) n/a 
0.1429 
(0.1022) 
λ -1.4548*** 
(0.4016) 
1.1799** 
(0.5741) 
1.2510*** 
(0.4279) 
-0.0260 
(0.1817) 
-0.9719*** 
(0.3168) 
1.1759** 
(0.5982) 
0.8731** 
(0.3623) 
-0.2961 
(0.2013) 
Adj. R2 0.2007 0.1991 0.1932 0.2278 0.3006 0.2983 0.2927 0.3175 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table 4.9  Summary of the Results of the Endogeneity Tests 
 Processing Wholesale Retail Restaurant 
 Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
D1,i,t n/aa n/a  +   - - 
D2,i,t +b +c n/a n/a   + + 
D3,i,t d  +  n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D4,i,t  -b n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D5,i,t - -   - - + + 
D6,i,t   - - n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D7,i,t -  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D8,i,t  -  -  +   
D9,i,t -  n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
bA positive or negative sign indicates the sign of the coefficient on lambda in the second stage of Heckman’s two step procedure. 
c The darker shaded cells denote the cases in which the signs on lambda using the assets and sales multipliers are the same and the 
lambdas are both significant. 
dThe lighter shaded cells denote the cases in which the lambdas for both the asset and sales multiplier are insignificant. 
 
CHAPTER 5 - SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The strategic decision a firm makes in determining where to set its vertical and horizontal 
boundaries is a widely discussed topic in the literature. While there are many studies that 
investigate whether there is a premium or a discount that results from diversification, this study 
contributes several unique ideas to the current literature on this topic.  First, the analysis involves 
a study of one industry, the food economy.  Second, it extends the literature by dividing the 
diversification variable into integration and unrelated diversification. 
Vertical and horizontal integration are important topics in the agricultural economics 
literature but most of the papers are theoretical or current events discussions.  There are very few 
empirical studies examining the impact of vertical and horizontal integration on firm value.  The 
analysis above adds to the literature on this topic with an empirical application. 
Because firms diversify and integrate for different reasons, it is not immediately clear 
how these decisions affect firm value.  The objective of this research is to determine whether 
food economy firms pursuing diversification or integration are valued lower or higher as a whole 
than the sum of their individual segments would be if they were stand-alone firms.  This is 
commonly referred to as a premium or discount.  The hypothesis is that a premium exists for 
food economy firms that pursue integration activities and a discount exists for food economy 
firms that pursue diversification activities.  Four separate food economy sectors are used in the 
analysis: food processing, wholesale grocery, retail supermarkets, and restaurants. 
To determine whether a premium or discount exists for integration or diversification, an 
excess value calculation method originally developed by Berger and Ofek (1995) is used which 
compares the actual value of a firm to the imputed value of all of the segments of a firm.  This 
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excess value is then used in an SUR framework to determine how certain firm characteristics 
influence firm value.  But these firm effects may both lead a firm to diversify or integrate and 
affect firm value.  This would incorrectly attribute a discount to the diversification or integration 
itself and not the underlying firm characteristics that caused the firm to pursue such a strategy.  
To account for these underlying firm and industry characteristics, Heckman’s two-stage 
procedure is used to control for the self-selection of firms that diversify. 
5.1 Conclusions 
According to the SUR results, the hypothesis that integration leads to a premium for food 
economy firms cannot be rejected for the restaurant sector and for the processing sector expect in 
the case of vertical integration into retail.  The hypothesis that integration leads to a premium for 
food economy firms also cannot be rejected in the wholesale sector for vertical integration into 
processing (D1,i,t) using both multipliers and vertical integration into retail (D3,i,t) using the sales 
multiplier.  The hypothesis that integration leads to a premium for food economy firms also 
cannot be rejected in the retail sector for vertical integration into processing using the asset 
multiplier (D1,i,t), vertical integration into wholesale using the sales multiplier (D2,i,t), and 
horizontal integration using the asset multiplier (D6,i,t).  The hypothesis that diversification leads 
to a discount for food economy firms is not rejected for the wholesale sector using the asset 
multiplier and for the retail sector using the sales multiplier because a discount is found for 
unrelated diversification (D5,i,t) in these cases. 
The endogeneity tests indicate that, in most cases, particularly in the processing and 
restaurant sectors, the diversification or integration decisions are endogenous.  In other words, 
the firm effects that cause firms to diversify or integrate are positively or negatively correlated 
with firm value.  In the cases of vertical integration into wholesale in the processing and 
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restaurant sectors and unrelated diversification in the restaurant sector, including a self selection 
parameter makes the premiums found using SUR become discounts.  Therefore, the hypothesis 
that there is a premium for integration is rejected in the case of vertical integration into wholesale 
in the processing and restaurant sectors.  The discount found using SUR becomes a premium in 
the case of vertically integrated wholesale firms.  Therefore, the hypothesis that there is a 
premium for integration cannot be rejected in this case. 
The results of this research are important to managers in the food economy who are 
trying to make strategic decisions regarding diversification and integration.  The results can also 
provide insight to investors who are deciding which companies to invest in and how the 
integration and diversification decisions of these companies might impact future firm value. 
5.2 Limitations and Future Research 
One of the limitations of this study is that what is considered unrelated diversification is 
sometimes not completely unrelated.  For example, Anheuser-Busch produces their own cans 
which is vertical integration but not vertical integration into the food economy, which is what is 
of interest in this study.  Also, Seaboard has a transportation division that could be considered 
vertical integration but in this research is considered as unrelated diversification.  Future research 
could separate these activities into a category for vertical integration that is outside of the food 
economy. 
Contracting is another form of coordination that is very important in agricultural markets.  
The Contracting and Organizations Research Institute has collected data on over 65,000 
contracts.  Combining data used in this study with data regarding contracting and using similar 
analysis would give interesting insight into how contracting affects firm value. 
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This research looks at which SIC codes companies report under in a given year but not 
how these SIC codes are changing across years within firms.  There is no distinction made 
between firms who purchase assets to expand within their current business and firms that 
purchase other, already established brands or businesses.  Investigating these changes over time 
and how they affect firm value would also be interesting. 
This research has found that the decision firms make on where to set horizontal and 
vertical boundaries is complex for food economy firms.  Nonetheless, the research has identified 
several integration and diversification strategies that have created premiums relative to single 
segment firms and other strategies which have led to discounts. 
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Appendix A - Relevant U.S. Department of Commerce SIC Code 
Classifications 
Below are the SIC classifications and codes used in this study as given by the US Department of 
Labor’s Occupational Safety and Health Administration at 
http://www.osha.gov/pls/imis/sic_manual.html.  
Division D:  Manufacturing 
 Major Group 20:  Food and Kindred Products 
  Industry Group 201:  Meat Products 
   2011 Meat Packing Plants 
   2013 Sausages and Other Prepared Meat Products 
   2015 Poultry Slaughtering and Processing 
  Industry Group 202:  Dairy Products 
   2021 Creamery Butter 
   2022 Natural, Processed, and Imitation Cheese 
   2023 Dry, Condensed, and Evaporated Dairy Products 
   2024 Ice Cream and Frozen Desserts 
   2026 Fluid Milk 
Industry Group 203:  Canned, Frozen, and Preserved Fruits and Vegetables 
  2032 Canned Specialties 
 2033 Canned Fruits, Vegetables, Preserves, Jams, and Jellies 
 2034 Dried and Dehydrated Fruits, Vegetables, and Soup Mixes 
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2035 Pickled Fruits and Vegetables, Vegetable Sauces and Seasonings, 
and Salad Dressings 
 2037 Frozen Fruits, Fruit Juices, and Vegetables 
 2038 Frozen Specialties, Not Elsewhere Classified  
Industry Group 204:  Grain Mill Products 
 2041 Flour and Other Grain Mill Products 
 2043 Cereal Breakfast Foods 
 2044 Rice Milling 
 2045 Prepared Flour Mixes and Doughs 
 2046 Wet Corn Milling 
 2047 Dog and Cat Food 
2048 Prepared Feed and Feed Ingredients for Animals and Fowls, Except 
Dogs and Cats 
Industry Group 205:  Bakery Products 
 2051 Bread and Other Bakery Products, Except Cookies and Crackers 
 2052 Cookies and Crackers 
 2053 Frozen Bakery Products, Except Bread  
Industry Group 206:  Sugar and Confectionary Products 
 2061 Cane Sugar, Except Refining 
 2062 Cane Sugar Refining 
 2063 Beet Sugar 
 2064 Candy and Other Confectionary Products 
 2066 Chocolate and Cocoa Products 
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 2067 Chewing Gum 
 2068 Salted and Roasted Nuts and Seeds 
Industry Group 207:  Fats and Oils 
 2074 Cottonseed Oil Mills 
 2075 Soybean Oil Mills 
 2076 Vegetable Oil Mills, Except Corn, Cottonseed, and Soybean 
 2077 Animal and Marine Fats and Oils 
2079 Shortening, Table Oils, Margarine, and Other Edible Fats and Oils, 
Not Elsewhere Classified 
Industry Group 208:  Beverages 
 2082 Malt Beverages 
 2083 Malt 
 2084 Wines, Brandy, and Brandy Spirits 
 2085 Distilled and Blended Liquors 
 2086 Bottled and Canned Soft Drinks and Carbonated Waters 
 2087 Flavoring Extracts and Flavoring Syrups, Not Elsewhere Classified 
Industry Group 209:  Miscellaneous Food Preparations and Kindred 
 2091 Canned and Cured Fish and Seafood 
 2092 Prepared Fresh and Frozen Fish and Seafoods 
 2095 Roasted Coffee 
 2096 Potato Chips, Corn Chips, and Similar Snacks 
 2097 Manufactured Ice 
 2098 Macaroni, Spaghetti, Vermicelli, and Noodles 
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 2099 Food Preparations, Not Elsewhere Classified 
Division F:  Wholesale Trade 
 Major Group 51:  Wholesale Trade Non-durable Goods 
  Industry Group 514:  Groceries and Related Products 
   5141 Groceries General Line 
Division G:  Retail Trade 
 Major Group 54:  Food Stores 
  5411 Grocery Stores 
 Major Group 58:  Eating and Drinking Places 
  5812 Eating Places 
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Appendix B - Numerical Example of Excess Value Calculations 
Suppose firm i operates in a food economy where there are five firms and all five firms operate 
in the same segment, segment 1, meaning the firms are not diversified.  We will call segment 1 
cookies and crackers manufacturing in this example.  For firms in this segment, total capital, Vi1 
= [0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.2, 1.3] and, the value of assets, ai1 = [1, 1.1, 1.15, 1.25, 1.35].  Therefore, the 
median ratio for segment 1, using equation (1), is  
(22)     9565.0
15.1
1.1
1
1 ==
m
m
a
V
 
Now suppose there is one more firm, firm 6, that is diversified.  This firm is diversified 
into two segments, segment 1 (cookies and crackers manufacturing) and segment 2 (meat 
packing).  Assume the median ratio was calculated for segment 2, just as it was for segment 1 in 
(22) above and we found that Vm2 / am2 = 1.17.  Also, assume that a6j = [3.2, 3.4].   
So, using equation (2), 
(23)    IV61 = 3.2 x 0.9565 = 3.0608 
and  
(24)    IV62 = 3.4 x 1.17 = 3.978 
So, inserting (23) and (24) into (3) yields,  
(25)    IV6 = 3.0608 + 3.978 = 7.0388 
Now assume that total capital for firm 6 is 6.4 so V6 = 6.4.  Using equation (4) we find 
(26)     EV6 = ln (6.4 / 7.0388) = ln(0.9092) = -0.0951. 
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Thus, V6 < IV6 or 6.4 < 7.0388.  This suggests that, for the diversified firm in this example, 
excess value is negative and the value of the firm is less than the sum of the imputed values of its 
segments. 
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Appendix C - Binary Variable Aggregation Details 
Table C.1  Integration and Diversification Categories 
Variable 
Name 
Variable Definition Number 
of Firms 
D1 vertical integration - processing 69 
D2 vertical integration - wholesale 48 
D3 vertical integration - retail 46 
D4 vertical integration - restaurants 27 
D5 vertical integration - production 9 
D6 horizontal integration 232 
D7 unrelated diversification 171 
D8 vertical integration - processing and horizontal integration 2 
D9 vertical integration - wholesale and horizontal integration 17 
D10 vertical integration - retail and horizontal integration 17 
D11 vertical integration - restaurants and horizontal integration 30 
D12 vertical integration - production and horizontal integration 4 
D13 vertical integration - processing and unrelated diversification 8 
D14 vertical integration - wholesale and unrelated diversification 6 
D15 vertical integration - retail and unrelated diversification 0 
D16 vertical integration - restaurants and unrelated diversification 0 
D17 vertical integration - production and unrelated diversification 8 
D18 horizontal integration and unrelated diversification 50 
D19 vertical integration - processing and horizontal integration and unrelated 
diversification 0 
D20 vertical integration - wholesale and horizontal integration and unrelated 
diversification 0 
D21 vertical integration - retail and horizontal integration and unrelated 
diversification 3 
D22 vertical integration - restaurants and horizontal integration and unrelated 
diversification 0 
D23 vertical integration - production and horizontal integration and unrelated 
diversification 4 
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Table C.2  Binary Variable Specification 
  Number of Firms 
Variable 
Name 
Variable 
Definition 
Processing Wholesale Retail Restaurant Total 
D1,i,t D1+D8+D13+D19 0 25 14 40 79 
D2,i,t D2+D9+D14+D20 27 0 25 19 71 
D3,i,t D3+D10+D15+D21 5 61 0 0 66 
D4,i,t D4+D11+D16+D22 57 0 0 0 57 
D5,i,t D7 91 16 31 34 172 
D6,i,t D6 220 11 0 0 231 
D7,i,t D18 50 0 0 0 50 
D8,i,t Single segment 
firms 1481 134 400 1313 3328 
D9,i,t D5+D12+D17+D23 24 0 0 0 24 
Appendix D - SUR Results with Time Trend 
Table D.1  Seemingly Unrelated Regression Results for Food Economy Firms by Sector with Each Multiplier as Dependent 
Variable with Time Trend 
 Processing Wholesale Retail Restaurants 
 Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Asset 
Multiplier 
Sales 
Multiplier 
Intercept 0.0022 
(0.0086) 
0.0017 
(0.0095) 
0.0002 
(0.0028) 
0.0001 
(0.0036) 
0.0000 
(0.0025) 
0.0000 
(0.0029) 
0.0008 
(0.0067) 
0.0005 
(0.0074) 
X1,i,t -0.0259*** 
(0.0058) 
-0.0541*** 
(0.0064) 
0.0784*** 
(0.0084) 
0.0762*** 
(0.0107) 
-0.0706*** 
(0.0052) 
-0.0848*** 
(0.0060) 
-0.0071 
(0.0072) 
-0.1333*** 
(0.0079) 
X2,i,t 1.4943*** 
(0.1041) 
1.6140*** 
(0.1152) 
-1.4281*** 
(0.1212) 
-0.8691*** 
(0.1556) 
11.8213*** 
(0.3372) 
14.8652*** 
(0.3916) 
1.9630*** 
(0.1165) 
1.0709*** 
(0.1281) 
X3,i,t 0.2632** 
(0.1243) 
2.0070*** 
(0.1376) 
-0.0844 
(0.1281) 
2.8876*** 
(0.1644) 
-0.1652 
(0.2222) 
4.8593*** 
(0.2580) 
1.5665*** 
(0.0836) 
2.8373*** 
(0.0920) 
X4,i,t -0.0269 
(0.0452) 
0.0116 
(0.0500) 
0.5657*** 
(0.0555) 
0.0830 
(0.0713) 
-0.1511*** 
(0.0346) 
-0.1513*** 
(0.0402) 
0.2003*** 
(0.0239) 
0.1345*** 
(0.0262) 
X5,i,t 0.0008*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0021*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0031*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.0037*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0031*** 
(0.0002) 
0.0035*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0004 
(0.0003) 
0.0060*** 
(0.0004) 
X6,i,t 0.2208*** 
(0.0218) 
0.1340*** 
(0.0242) 
-0.0928 
(0.0772) 
-0.1149 
(0.0991) 
0.1893*** 
(0.0181) 
0.1049*** 
(0.0210) 
0.2597*** 
(0.0515) 
0.2008*** 
(0.0566) 
Year 0.0154** 
(0.0066) 
0.0054 
(0.0073) 
-0.0779*** 
(0.0082) 
-0.0348*** 
(0.0106) 
-0.0008 
(0.0051) 
-0.0350*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0029 
(0.0074) 
0.0167** 
(0.0081) 
Year2 -0.0007*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0003 
(0.0003) 
0.0023*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0001 
(0.0004) 
-0.0004** 
(0.0002) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
-0.0007** 
(0.0003) 
D1,i,t 
n/aa n/a 
-1.0846*** 
(0.0393) 
-1.4056*** 
(0.0505) 
-0.6959*** 
(0.0418) 
-0.8606*** 
(0.0485) 
-0.5815*** 
(0.0559) 
-0.5850*** 
(0.0615) 
D2,i,t -0.8304*** 
(0.0772) 
-0.9721*** 
(0.0855) n/a n/a 
-1.1499*** 
(0.0321) 
-1.2006*** 
(0.0372) 
-0.9332*** 
(0.0803) 
-0.7792*** 
(0.0883) 
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D3,i,t -0.2165 
(0.1769) 
-0.0849 
(0.1958) 
-0.9079*** 
(0.0312) 
-1.0836*** 
(0.0400) n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D4,i,t -0.7568*** 
(0.0542) 
-0.7300*** 
(0.0600) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D5,i,t -0.0618 
(0.0430) 
-0.0588 
(0.0476) 
-0.2633*** 
(0.0524) 
0.1568** 
(0.0673) 
-0.4930*** 
(0.0289) 
-0.4345*** 
(0.0335) 
-0.5781*** 
(0.0606) 
-0.4546*** 
(0.0667) 
D6,i,t -0.8003*** 
(0.0300) 
-0.7443*** 
(0.0332) 
-0.2584*** 
(0.0592) 
-0.5053*** 
(0.0760) 
-0.5310*** 
(0.1511) 
-0.3821** 
(0.1754) n/a n/a 
D7,i,t -0.9922*** 
(0.0574) 
-0.9426*** 
(0.0635) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
D9,i,t -0.4570*** 
(0.0819) 
-0.7549*** 
(0.0907) n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
System 
Weighted R2 0.3998 0.4651       
an/a denotes not applicable. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Appendix E - Probit Results 
Table E.1  Probit Results from the First Stage of Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Processing Firms 
 D2,i,t ME D3,i,t ME D4,i,t ME D5,i,t ME 
Intercept -5.2558 
(4.9414) 
-0.1532 -40.8269 
(30.8809) 
-0.0476 3.1962 
(3.1397) 
0.1844 -9.7269*** 
(3.5340) 
-1.0005 
X1,i,t 0.2638 
(0.5022) 
0.0077 3.5300 
(2.9207) 
0.0041 -0.5794* 
(0.3215) 
-0.0334 0.7303** 
(0.3535) 
0.0751 
X2,i,t -1.6547* 
(0.9402) 
-0.0482 2.0212 
(2.6018) 
0.0024 -1.0307 
(0.6275) 
-0.0595 0.3623 
(0.6715) 
0.0373 
X3,i,t -3.6952* 
(2.2364) 
-0.1077 -1.4363 
(4.0913) 
-0.0017 0.7404 
(0.6720) 
0.0427 -1.7294 
(1.0901) 
-0.1779 
X4,i,t -0.0945 
(0.3877) 
-0.0028 0.3106 
(0.9459) 
0.0004 -0.5068 
(0.3317) 
-0.0292 -0.0028 
(0.2591) 
-0.0003 
X5,i,t -0.0048 
(0.0126) 
-0.0001 -0.0815 
(0.0688) 
-0.0001 0.0166** 
(0.0081) 
0.0010 -0.0158*** 
(0.0087) 
-0.0016 
X6,i,t 0.1217 
(0.1708) 
0.0038 -0.3030 
(0.3631) 
-0.0003 -0.4536*** 
(0.1754) 
-0.0215 0.0347 
(0.1058) 
0.0036 
 D6,i,t ME D7,i,t ME D8,i,t ME D9,i,t ME 
Intercept -0.3138 
(2.5620) 
-0.0512 -7.4810 
(4.7133) 
-0.3496 0.1491 
(2.0500) 
0.0442 -3.3855 
(5.6357) 
-0.0461 
X1,i,t -0.2685 
(0.2580) 
-0.0438 0.4376 
(0.4699) 
0.0205 0.2464 
(0.2084) 
0.0731 -0.0612 
(0.5565) 
-0.0008 
X2,i,t -0.4897 
(0.5391) 
-0.0798 -1.1919 
(0.7970) 
-0.0557 0.8903** 
(0.4104) 
0.2640 -2.5341** 
(1.0867) 
-0.0345 
X3,i,t -1.8736** 
(0.8583) 
-0.3055 0.4624 
(0.8692) 
0.0216 1.2130** 
(0.5950) 
0.3596 -7.4207* 
(3.8242) 
-0.1011 
X4,i,t -0.0513 
(0.2162) 
-0.0084 -0.9705** 
(0.4151) 
-0.0454 0.3024* 
(0.1767) 
0.0897 0.4307 
(0.4073) 
0.0059 
X5,i,t 0.0116* 0.0019 -0.0071 -0.0003 -0.0116** -0.0034 0.0063 0.0001 
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(0.0064) (0.0115) (0.0052) (0.0135) 
X6,i,t -0.3734*** 
(0.0977) 
-0.0540 -0.2641* 
(0.1545) 
-0.0109 0.3285*** 
(0.0786) 
0.0912 0.2290 
(0.1859) 
0.0036 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table E.2  Probit Results from the First Stage of  Heckman's Two-Step Procedure for Wholesale Firms 
 D1,i,t ME D3,i,t ME D5,i,t ME D6,i,t ME D8,i,t ME 
Intercept -73.103*** 
(24.0817) 
-2.3591 -56.653*** 
(19.6072) 
-7.3302 -90.047*** 
(32.0895) 
-0.0357 -75.581 
(57.0422) 
-0.0153 30.393*** 
(8.0493) 
11.7974 
X1,i,t 7.4125*** 
(2.4806) 
0.2392 5.2589*** 
(1.9409) 
0.6804 10.497*** 
(3.7840) 
0.0042 6.9619 
(5.5247) 
0.0014 -2.8984*** 
(0.8436) 
-1.1251 
X2,i,t 6.9421 
(6.2007) 
0.2240 -4.7331 
(3.1916) 
-0.6124 -3.7180*** 
(1.4468) 
-0.0015 4.9241 
(23.0844) 
0.0010 3.6572*** 
(1.2420) 
1.4196 
X3,i,t -8.2540 
(10.3016) 
-0.2664 -3.3470 
(6.5194) 
-0.4331 1.2895 
(1.8501) 
0.0005 -3.6440 
(33.8364) 
-0.0007 -0.8986 
(1.5548) 
-0.3488 
X4,i,t 1.0437 
(0.6749) 
0.0337 1.1203* 
(0.6322) 
0.1450 0.0440 
(0.6349) 
0.0000 -6.2124** 
(2.6025) 
-0.0013 -0.6096 
(0.4479) 
-0.2366 
X5,i,t -0.1908*** 
(0.0638) 
-0.0062 -0.1225** 
(0.0479) 
-0.0158 -0.3089*** 
(0.1113) 
-0.0001 -0.1593 
(0.1339) 
0.0000 0.0684*** 
(0.0219) 
0.0265 
X6,i,t 0.6585 
(0.5475) 
0.0428 n/aa n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.2872 
(0.5326) 
0.1067 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table E.3  Probit Results from the First Stage of Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Retail Firms 
 D1,i,t ME D2,i,t ME D5,i,t ME D8,i,t ME 
Intercept -48.5889* 
(29.2858) 
-1.8369 -10.6436 
(19.4830) 
-0.6542 -13.6697 
(13.5006) 
-1.5371 18.7905* 
(11.0463) 
4.1703 
X1,i,t 4.6696 
(2.8852) 
0.1765 0.4931 
(1.8366) 
0.0303 1.1124 
(1.3167) 
0.1251 -1.5666 
(1.0675) 
-0.3477 
X2,i,t 17.4383** 
(7.5061) 
0.6593 -11.6801** 
(5.6555) 
-0.7179 -5.7616 
(4.3393) 
-0.6479 3.2129 
(3.6119) 
0.7131 
X3,i,t -1.8645 
(5.2197) 
-0.0705 -0.3709 
(4.5439) 
-0.0228 1.3982 
(2.8100) 
0.1572 0.6817 
(2.6259) 
0.1513 
X4,i,t 1.5442*** 
(0.5106) 
0.0584 0.8675* 
(0.4484) 
0.0533 -1.5086*** 
(0.5758) 
-0.1696 -0.1612 
(0.3323) 
-0.0358 
X5,i,t -0.1187* 
(0.0707) 
-0.0045 -0.0033 
(0.0432) 
-0.0002 -0.0240 
(0.0320) 
-0.0027 0.0338 
(0.0256) 
0.0075 
X6,i,t 0.0970 
(0.3260) 
0.0039 0.4558* 
(0.2452) 
0.0372 n/aa n/a 0.2057 
(0.1929) 
0.0425 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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Table E.4  Probit Results from the First Stage of Heckman’s Two-Step Procedure for Restaurant Firms 
 D1,i,t ME D2,i,t ME D5,i,t ME D8,i,t ME 
Intercept -43.2098*** 
(11.7885) 
-0.9775 -37.5193*** 
(14.0285) 
-0.4786 -7.3332 
(5.3456) 
-0.2078 24.3928***
(5.6439) 
1.7324 
X1,i,t 4.3032*** 
(1.2447) 
0.0973 3.7001** 
(1.4874) 
0.0472 0.6132 
(0.5770) 
0.0174 -2.4064*** 
(0.6010) 
-0.1709 
X2,i,t 3.0390* 
(1.7475) 
0.0687 -1.6667 
(1.5052) 
-0.0213 2.7737* 
(1.5980) 
0.0786 -2.0536* 
(1.1324) 
-0.1459 
X3,i,t -5.7555*** 
(1.8089) 
-0.1302 -6.2129** 
(2.4890) 
-0.0793 -8.0562*** 
(2.0657) 
-0.2283 7.7233*** 
(1.3866) 
0.5485 
X4,i,t -0.0342 
(0.2609) 
-0.0008 -0.2649 
(0.3648) 
-0.0034 -0.7196** 
(0.3549) 
-0.0204 0.4129* 
(0.2157) 
0.0293 
X5,i,t -0.1104*** 
(0.0327) 
-0.0025 -0.0944** 
(0.0392) 
-0.0012 -0.0154 
(0.0154) 
-0.0004 0.0608*** 
(0.0158) 
0.0043 
X6,i,t n/aa  
n/a 
0.1114 
(0.4353) 
0.0016 n/a n/a 0.8384** 
(0.4115) 
0.0299 
an/a denotes not applicable. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
*Significant at the 10% level. 
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